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This dissertation examines the allocation of inventive ideas through the trade
of patent portfolios, the measurement of inventive output and the design of
mechanisms to encourage investment in research and development.
The first chapter introduces a new data set of patent portfolios traded be-
tween 1990 and 2011 consisting of 2,045 granted U.S. patents and patent appli-
cations. Combined with a random sample of all patent portfolios traded in 2005,
this new data set allows for the derivation of estimates of the size of the market
for patents, which is estimated at $10 billion in 2005. The average value of a
traded patent is about $505,000. Patent portfolios acquired by patent assertion
entities (PAEs)-companies that purchase patents without the intention of using
the underlying technology internally, but instead focus on the assertion of the
purchased patents against manufacturers already using the technology-account
for about $380 million or 3.8 percent of the total market. The litigation rate for
traded patents is 2.3 percent during the acquiring entity’s term of ownership.
Patents acquired by PAEs do not have an increased likelihood of being litigated
compared to other traded patents.
The second chapter examines field trial data for patented corn hybrids to
quantify the relationship between patents, citations, and the magnitude of in-
ventive output. Field trial data for 256 corn hybrids patented between 1986
and 2005 suggest that most patented corn hybrids do not improve significantly
on prior art: 58 percent of patented hybrids produce less corn than existing hy-
brids. However, there exists a relationship between the number of subsequently
granted U.S. patents citing a patent in our data and the magnitude of inventive
output: A 10 percentage point increase in yields is associated with 1.9 additional
citations.
The third chapter examines the optimal design of mechanisms of awarding
patents and prizes under different information environments. Using the full
information environment as the benchmark, I analyze the case in which infor-
mation about the value of an innovation is either (i) only observed by the in-
novating firm or (ii) observed by the innovating firm and another firm in the
same industry. In general, the social planner awards prizes whenever these are
available as a policy instrument. While there exist mechanisms to reveal the
social value of an innovation under the private information environment, truth
telling can only be achieved by providing some patent protection in most of
the considered cases. The social surplus is then lower than the full information
benchmark. When market information about the social value of an innovation
is available from a competitor, the social planner can achieve the same level of
social surplus as in the full information benchmark.
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CHAPTER 1
THEMARKET FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: EVIDENCE FROM
TRADED PATENT PORTFOLIOS
1.1 Introduction
The market for intellectual property has been growing significantly over the
last two decades (Arora and Gambardella, 2010; Chesbrough, 2006).1 Ac-
companying the growing importance, there is increased debate among aca-
demics, policy makers and the business audience, whether the benefit of pro-
moting the efficient allocation of technology outweighs the drawbacks of an
increased amount of litigation and rent seeking behavior of patent assertion en-
tities (PAEs)-companies that purchase patents without the intention of using
the underlying technology internally, but instead focus on the assertion of these
purchased patents against manufacturers already using the technology.2
The possibility to trade patents allows for the division of labor between small
firms which specialize in generating inventions and large firms which specialize
in the commercialization of these inventions (Holmstrom, 1989; Gans and Stern,
2000; Gans et al., 2002). Similarly, companies might benefit from trading tech-
nology due to vertical specialization and comparative advantages: while some
companies have a comparative advantage in research, others have a compara-
tive advantage in manufacturing or marketing (Teece, 1986; Arora et al., 2001;
1The existence of a market for intellectual property is not a recent phenomenon. Lamore-
aux and Sokoloff (1996, 1999, and 2001) provide an overview of the market for patents in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
2The term ’Patent Assertion Entity’ (PAE) was put forward by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) in its recent report on the development of the intellectual property marketplace (FTC,
2011). Alternatively, the terms ’Non-Operating Company’, ’Non-Practicing Entity’ (NPE) or
’Patent Troll’ are commonly used.
1
Arora and Ceccagnoli, 2006). The management literature advances the idea of
Open Innovation: companies should allow externally developed inventions be-
ing brought into the firm and try to sell or license internally generated inven-
tions that are under- or unutilized to other companies (Chesbrough, 2003). The
possibility to trade patents also provides a salvage value for failed innovators
and thereby increases the incentives to invest into research and development ex
ante (Hall, 2009). Lastly, some companies might have a comparative advantage
in patent enforcement, i.e. the negotiation and collection of licensing fees as
well as patent litigation (Galasso et al., 2011).
Apart from these positive effects, patent transactions might also have nega-
tive effects on innovation. Lemley and Shapiro (2006) argue that patent trans-
actions constitute a serious threat of ex post hold-up for manufacturing firms,
which discourages investment in research and development (R&D) and requires
policy action. They find that PAEs file between 30 and 40 percent of all patent
suits in the computing and electronics industries. Similarly, the risk of litiga-
tion, for instance in the form of preliminary injunctions, discourages compa-
nies’ R&D efforts (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001). In addition, there might
be an effect on the direction of technological change. For instance, Lerner (1995)
finds that biotechnology firms avoid R&D in technology fields where the risk of
litigation is high.
Given the negative effects that patent transactions might have on innovation,
Merges (2009) considers corrective public policies including the (partial) ban of
patent trades. The concern that patent trades might deter innovation is currently
at the center of public policy debate and has been expressed in a recent report
by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission on the intellectual property marketplace
2
(FTC, 2011). In addition, Section 34 of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
(signed by President Obama on September 16, 2011) requires the Comptroller
General of the Unites States to carry out a study of the consequences of patent
litigation by PAEs.
The market for inventions can be segmented into those deals that involve
the licensing of inventions and those deals that involve the sale of inventions.3
Evaluating the relative size of these two segments is a challenging task due to
limited data availability. According to evidence from Europe and Japan, about
10 percent of patents get licensed.4 Using data on U.S. patents granted before
1983, Serrano (2010) finds that about 14 percent of patents are traded at least
once over their life cycle.5 The sale segment of the market is of particular interest
when studying the role of PAEs. A patent gives its owner the right to produce
using the underlying invention as well as the right to exclude others from using
the protected invention. For PAEs the value of a patent stems from the right to
exclude others. Their business model focuses on the collection of licensing fees
and attaining damages awarded from litigation.
There are no academic studies that provide dollar estimates of the size of the
market of traded patents. However, Oliver Wyman, a consultancy, estimates
the markets size at $1.2 billion per year.6 IPotential, a patent broker, provides an
3See for example Anand and Khanna (2000) and Arora et al. (2004) for empirical work on the
licensing segment of the market for inventions for the U.S., Gambardella et al. (2007) for Europe
and Motohashi (2008) and Kani and Motohashi (2012) for Japan. Estimates for the market size
of the licensing segment in the U.S. and also globally are reviewed by Arora and Gambardella
(2010).
4Based on data from the PatVal EU survey, Gambardella et al. (2007) find that 11 percent of
patents in Europe get licensed. Motohashi (2008) finds that 9 percent of Japanese patents get
licensed.
5Chesbrough (2006) provides estimates for patents granted between 1985 and 1997 and finds
that 25 percent of patents are traded at least once over their life cycle. However, these estimates
are likely to be upward biased. For instance, the estimates include assignments (and releases)
of patents as collateral to financial institutions.
6As reported by Kelley (2011). These estimates are based on fifty structured interviews of
3
estimate of about $1.5 billion for the year 2008 (Chernesky, 2009).
Using companies’ filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) database
on patent ownership, this paper introduces a newly constructed data set of 105
patent portfolios consisting of 1,510 U.S. granted patents and 535 patent appli-
cations traded among companies between 1990 and 2011. The combined ob-
served market value of these 105 portfolios is $872,525,049 (in 2005 $).7 The
average market value of a traded patent in this data set is $426,663. Out of
the 105 patent portfolios, 31 portfolios (or 29.5 percent) were acquired by PAEs.
The companies’ filings also reveal that a clear distinction between the licens-
ing and selling of patents does not always exist. In 17 out of the 105 deals (or
16.2 percent), the contractual agreement between the two companies included
additional royalty payments from the new to the previous owner of the traded
patents. Furthermore, 48 agreements (or 45.6 percent) included a license back
to the previous owner of the traded patent portfolio.
The benefit of providing direct market values of traded patent portfolios
comes with the drawback that the reported trades are unlikely to represent a
random sample of all patent trades. Combined with a random sample of 468
patent portfolios from the population of all traded patent portfolios and con-
trolling for selection, the new data set allows for the derivation of estimates of
the total market for patents. The total size of the market for patents is estimated
at $9,975 million in 2005. The average value of a traded patent in this random
sample of traded patents is $505,062. Patents belonging to the technology fields
inventors, intellectual property law firms, brokers and intermediaries, academics, industry ex-
perts, and intellectual property counsels from large technology companies carried out in early
2009.
7All U.S. dollar figures reported in the remainder of this chapter are in 2005 $.
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‘Electrical and Electronics’ and ‘Computers and Communication’ account for
24.5 and 24.2 percent of the traded patents respectively, followed by ‘Drugs and
Medical’ patents, which account for 14.1 percent. Trades involving PAEs ac-
count for an estimated $379,888,702 or 3.8 percent out of the total market of
$9,975 million.
Out of the total population of all patents, only a small number of patents get
litigated. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) find that 0.6 percent of patents get
litigated over their lifetime. The litigation rate, which is defined as the number
of cases per hundred patents, is 1.1 percent. The litigation rate is larger than the
rate of patents litigated as the same patent might be litigated several times.8 The
litigation rate for patents from the random sample of 468 traded patent portfo-
lios is 2.3 percent during the acquiring entity’s term of ownership. However,
patents acquired by PAEs do not have an increased likelihood of being litigated
compared to other traded patents.
1.2 Data
1.2.1 Data set of 105 patent portfolios traded between 1990 and
2011
The two main data sources used to construct the data set of patent portfolios
traded among companies between 1990 and 2011 are companies’ SEC filings
8Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001) estimates are based on patents with application years
1980-1984. Lemley (2001) estimates that at most 2 percent of all patents are ever litigated based
on the patent stock in force and the number of patent lawsuits in 1999.
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Table 1.1: Key Word Search Results
Notes: Data are companies’ SEC filings between 1990 and 2011 accessed through LexisNexis.
and patent assignment data from the USPTO.9 Key word searches for phrases
such as “patent purchase agreement” in the SEC filings were used to identify
those documents that might contain information about traded patent portfolios.
In total, 22 different phrases were used for the key word search and resulted in
5,746 documents (Table 1.1). The number of almost six thousand hits largely
overstates the number of identified traded patent portfolios for two reasons:
(i) a document might not contain information about a traded patent portfolio
or (ii) the same patent trade is reported in multiple documents.10 An example
9LexisNexis Academic provides access to the full text of EDGAR filings by domestic and
foreign companies from 1991 as well as annual and quarterly reports and proxy statements of
more than 4,000 US companies, filed with the SEC since 1987. EDGAR is the SEC’s Electronic
Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval system that provides access to those forms (including
annual and quarterly reports) that companies are required to file with the SEC by law. The
USPTO’s patent assignment data is available at http://assignments.uspto.gov.
10One example for a search result that does not provide information on an actual patent trade
comes from the key word search for the phrase “patent sale agreement“, which returned the
6
of such multiple reporting of the same traded patent portfolio is Advance Cell
Technology Inc.’s filing of Form 424B3 (prospectus; filed on June 27th, 2007) as
well as Exhibit 10 (material contract; filed on March 28th, 2007). Both documents
report the acquisition of patents formerly owned by Infigen Inc.
After reading the full text of the 5,746 documents, I identified 105 patent
portfolios traded between January 1st, 1990 and June 30th, 2011.11 An exam-
ple is Cirrus Logic Inc.’s filing of Form 10-K (annual report; filed on May 25th,
2011) that resulted from the key word search for the phrase “patent purchase
agreement”:
“On July 13, 2010, we entered into a Patent Purchase Agreement for
the sale of certain Company owned patents. As a result of this agree-
ment, on August 31, 2010, the Company received cash consideration
of $4.0 million from the purchaser.”
Companies file a variety of different forms with the SEC, but information about
traded patent portfolios is mostly reported directly in the annual or quarterly
reports, in current reports or in the exhibits to those reports (Table 1.2).12 The
SEC requires companies to report “Material Definitive Agreements” or “Mate-
10-K filing of Vitesse Semiconductor Corp. (filed on December 31st, 2008) containing the fol-
lowing statement: “The Company typically sells its products to its customers pursuant to the
Company’s standard sales agreement, which contains [. . . ] certain provisions for indemnifying
the customer against losses, liabilities, costs, and expenses resulting from a claim alleging that
the Company’s product infringes a third-party’s United States patent. The sales agreement [em-
phasis added] generally limits the indemnification obligations in a variety of industry-standard
respects, including, but not limited to [. . . ]”.
11The data includes all traded patent portfolios up until June 30th, 2011, which were reported
in SEC filings by August 1st, 2011. The data is possibly truncated in the sense that there might be
patent portfolios traded before June 30th, 2011, which are reported in SEC filings after August
1st, 2011.
12Companies have to file annual reports on form 10-K and quarterly reports on form 10-Q. If a
company qualifies as a small business it uses forms 10-K-SB and 10-Q-SB. In addition companies
must file the current report form 8-K to announce major events.
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Table 1.2: Search Results by Type of SEC Form
Notes: Data are companies’ SEC filings between 1990 and 2011 accessed through LexisNexis.
rial Contracts”. These are defined as an agreement or contract “not made in the
ordinary course of business which is material to the registrant” (Regulation S-K,
Item 601 b 10 i). Item 601 b 10 ii further specifies that “[i]f the contract is such
as ordinarily accompanies the kind of business conducted by the registrant and
its subsidiaries, it will be deemed to have been made in the ordinary course of
business and need not be filed unless it falls within one or more of the following
categories, in which case it shall be filed except where immaterial in amount or
significance: [. . . ] B. Any contract upon which the registrant’s business is sub-
stantially dependent, as in the case of continuing contracts to sell the major part
of registrant’s products or services or to purchase the major part of registrant’s
requirements of goods, services or raw materials or any franchise or license or
other agreement to use a patent [emphasis added], formula, trade secret, process
or trade name upon which registrant’s business depends to a material extent;
[. . . ].”
As demonstrated by the examples of Advance Cell Technology Inc. and Cir-
rus Logic Inc. above, information about traded patent portfolios can come from
the buyer or the seller of the patent portfolio. Out of the 105 traded patent port-
8
Figure 1.1: Price of traded Patent Portfolios by Year of Execution
Notes: Data on 105 traded patent portfolios from the SEC sample.
folios, 60 (or 57 percent) were reported through the seller and 45 (or 43 percent)
through the buyer of the patent portfolio.
The number of deals per year increased over time (Figure 1.1). Only 16 deals
occurred before 2000. The number of deals peaked in 2008, when 19 deals oc-
curred. Data for 2011 is truncated, since the sample only includes deals up June
30th, 2011 reported by August, 1st, 2011.
The companies’ SEC filings reveal information about the companies in-
volved in the trade, the date of the trade, the price paid as well as other con-
tractual agreements such as a license back to the seller or agreements about ad-
ditional royalty payments.13 In general, the filings do not include information
about the individual patents that were traded.
13Patent portfolio prices are reported in nominal terms. To derive prices in real terms, I use
GDP price index data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) using 2005 as the
base year (available at www.bea.gov).
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The USPTO’s assignment database provides information on the change of
ownership of individual patents for all recorded patent assignments from Au-
gust 1980 onwards. While there is no legal obligation for the buyer of a patent to
request the recording in the change of ownership, section 261 of the U.S. patent
act states that “[a]n assignment, grant, or conveyance shall be void as against
any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without
notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three
months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mort-
gage.” A company buying a patent therefore has the strong incentive to request
the recording of the ownership change. In addition, patent attorneys strongly
recommend the recording (Dykeman and Kopko, 2004).
Given the information on the seller (i.e. assignor) and the buyer (i.e. as-
signee), the USPTO’s assignment database provides a list of all the U.S. patents
and patent applications that were traded between these companies. In addition
to the names of the assignor and assignee, I used the information on the date
of the trade to control for the possibility that the same seller and buyer trade
patent portfolios multiple times. The SEC filings specify the date of the contrac-
tual agreement, while the USPTO’s assignment database provides information
on the execution date of the ownership change. An example of such a change
in ownership if provided in Figure 1.2, which identifies the U.S. patents traded
between Cirrus Logic Inc. (as the seller, i.e. assignor) and Huai Technologies
LLC (as the buyer, i.e. assignee) in 2010.14
Additional information about the individual patents and patent applica-
tions traded in the portfolios, such as the application date, the grant date, the
14To save space, the list of patents is truncated in the figure. The complete assignment record
includes information on 60 traded U.S. patents.
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Figure 1.2: Example of an Assignment Record
Notes: Data from the USPTO assignment database. To save space, the list of patents is truncated in the figure. The
complete assignment record includes information on 60 traded U.S. patents.
patent class, and the number of citations received from later patents, was ob-
tained from the USPTO Patent Full-Text database for granted patents (PatFT)
and USPTO Patent Full-Text database for applications (AppFT).15
It is possible to categorize patents with respect to industries or technology
fields based on the patent class of a granted patent or a patent application. The
USPTO assigns one of over 400 patent classes as the primary subclass to every
patent or patent application. Hall et al. (2001) provide a matching of these over
400 patent classes to 6 technology field categories. 1,050 out of 2,045 patents and
patent applications (51 percent) in the sample are ‘Computers and Communi-
cation” patents. 493 (or 24 percent) are ‘Electrical and Electronics’ patents and
283 (or 14 percent) are ‘Drugs and Medical’ patents (Table 1.3, Column 2 “SEC
15PatFT provides information on all granted U.S. patents since 1976 and is available at:
http://patft.uspto.gov. AppFT provides information on all published U.S. patent applications
since March 2001 and is available at: http://appft.uspto.gov.
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Table 1.3: Comparison of the Distribution of Technology Fields
Notes: Technology field definitions based on Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001).
sample”).16
To account for the heterogeneity in patent quality, I use the number of cita-
tions received from later patents and the number of claims as proxy variables.
Although there exists only limited empirical evidence on the validity of citations
by later patents as an indicator of patent quality, citations have emerged as the
standard measure of patent quality.17 To account for truncation in the observed
citation history (i.e. I observe a longer citation history for patents granted ear-
lier), I only consider citations received within 5 years after the grant date of a
patent. Empirical analysis have also used the number of claims in the granted
16A more detailed breakdown of the technology fields based on 37 subcategories is provided
in the appendix (Table A.1).
17There are some notable exceptions: Carpenter et al. (1981) compare citations for 100 “impor-
tant” patents between 1969 and 1974 with 102 control patents that had been issued in the same
year. In their study, important patents are defined as patents that they match with “the 100 most
significant technical products” selected by the journal Industrial and Research Development in
1969 and 1970. These 100 patents were cited 494 times between 1968 and 1974, compared with
102 control patents that were issued in the same years and were cited only 208 times. Similarly,
Albert et al. (1991) find a strong association between the number of citations counts and the tech-
nical importance of 77 silver halide technology patents granted between 1982 and 1983. Their
measure of technical importance is based on the expert opinion of 20 researchers and research
managers at Eastman Kodak, all of whom were working in the area of silver halide technology.
Trajtenberg (1990) shows that citations counts are positively correlated with the estimated social
surplus that 456 improvements in CAT scanners created over time. Moser et al. (2011) analyze
patents protecting new hybrid corn varieties and find that citations are highly correlated with
the magnitude of inventive output measured as the percentage increase in yield or income over
existing varieties.
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patent or patent application as a proxy for the quality or scope of a patent (Tong
and Frame, 1994; Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001), and claims have also been
proposed as an additional, complementary measure to patent citations for the
importance of patented inventions (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004).
The advantage of claims over citations lies in the availability of claims data
on both granted patents as well as pending applications. Therefore, the cur-
rent data set includes the information about the number of claims for all 2,045
patents and applications. The citation data is only available for the 1,510 patents
that were granted at the time of sale plus an additional 227 patent applications
that turned into granted patents at some point between the time of sale and the
date of the data collection (August 1st, 2011). 308 out of the original 535 patent
applications were still pending (as of August 1st, 2011).
The average patent in the sample receives 5.4 citations from later patents
within 5 years after its grant date (Table 1.4). The average number of claims per
patent is 23.08 (Table 1.4).
In addition to information on patents, the USPTO’s assignment database
provides information on assignments of trademarks. Only 6 out of the 105 deals
included trademarks in addition to patents. The average number of trademarks
per deal is 0.98 (Table 1.5).
Data on annual revenues were obtained for all public companies in the sam-
ple from the Compustat database. Since the sample is based on SEC filings, at
least one of the two companies involved in each of the deals is a public company
that discloses information on annual revenues.
In order to identify PAEs, I started with lists of previously identified PAEs.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics: Unit of Observation is a granted U.S. Patent
or Patent Application
Notes: Number of citations is the number of citations received from subsequent U.S. patents within 5 years after the
grant date. Average patent age at execution is measured as the number of months between the application date and the
execution date. Technology field definitions based on Hall et al. (2001).
Fischer and Henkel (2009) identify 48 different PAEs. Bessen et al. (2011) pro-
vide a list of 14 publicly traded PAEs. The combined list consists of 59 PAEs.
However, PAEs do not necessarily acquire patents under their company’s name,
but use shell companies instead. One example is Intellectual Ventures, one of
the dominant players in the industry. A list of shell companies that Intellectual
Ventures uses is provided in Niro (2007). Starting with this initial list combining
the findings of Bessen et al. (2011), Fischer and Henkel (2009) and Niro (2007),
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics: Unit of Observation is a traded Patent Port-
folio, SEC Sample
Notes: Number of citations is the number of citations received from subsequent U.S. patents within 5 years after the grant
date. Average patent age at execution is measured as the number of months between the application date and the execution
date. Technology field definitions based on Hall et al. (2001).
I was able to identify additional shell companies through a matching of ad-
dresses. Several shell companies used identical addresses (up to the office suite
number) in their filings with the USPTO.
Out of the 105 patent portfolios, 31 (or 30 percent) are acquired by PAEs (Ta-
ble 1.5). On the individual patent level, 587 out of the 2,045 granted patents and
patent applications (29 percent) are acquired by PAEs (Table 1.10). However, the
deal value of all patent portfolios acquired by PAEs only accounts for 13 percent
of the trade value of all trades combined ($114,123,340 out of $872,525,049; Table
1.10).
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Information on foreign patent family members for the traded U.S. granted
patents or patent applications were obtained from the European Patent Office
(EPO) espacenet database and the EPO Patent register.18
1.2.2 Random sample of 468 traded patent portfolios
In order to identify the population of all traded patents, I use all records on
patent assignments from the USPTO’s assignment database.19 The database
contains 3,045,258 records for the time period 1980 to 2010. Each record lists
a reason for the conveyance of a patent. The recordation form that companies
have to file with the USPTO (Form PTO-1595) provides a checkbox for “Assign-
ment”, “Security Agreement”, “Change of Name” and “Others”, which allows
companies to list their own reason. As a result, the database contains over 9,000
reasons for conveyance. 2,848,200 records (or 93.5 percent) list “Assignment of
Assignors Interest” as the reason for conveyance. The next two most common
reasons for conveyance are “Change of Name” (41,892 records; 1.4 percent) and
“Corrective Assignment” (23,609 records; 0.8 percent). In a first step, all records
that did not list “Assignment of Assignors Interest” as the conveyance reason
were excluded. For the remainder of the paper, I will refer to these remaining
2,848,200 records as the assignment records.
These assignment records include the initial assignment from the inventor
to his or her employer. Since these initial assignments take place within the
boundaries of a company, they should not be considered as part of the market
18The EPO espacenet database is available at http://worldwide.espacenet.com/. The EPO
Patent Register is available at https://register.epo.org/espacenet/regviewer.
19Google and the USPTO have entered into an agreement to make the USPTO‘s as-
signment data available to the public at no cost. Bulk data can be downloaded at
http://www.google.com/googlebooks/uspto.html.
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for patents. In order to account for the initial assignments, the first assignment
record for each patent with an execution date between the application date and
the grant date is dropped. This leads to a total of 824,391 records for the period
1990 to 2010. For the remainder of the paper, I will refer to these records as the
re-assignment records.
The number of re-assignments increased significantly from 17,011 in 1990 to
60,869 in 2004 (Figure 1.3, by year of execution). The date of recording a re-
assignment is not necessarily the same as the execution date of a re-assignment.
Re-assignment data is therefore truncated, which needs to be taken into account
in particular when interpreting data for the most recent years. In addition, the
analysis only includes those patents and patent applications that were granted
by December 31st, 2010. Two of the reasons to select the year 2005 as the base
year for most of the analysis in the paper were to minimize these effects of trun-
cation.
The number of re-assigned patents in 2005 is 53,807. However, this number
overstates the number of traded patents. Companies might choose to re-assign
patents within the boundaries of the company. In addition, the re-assignment
records might include initial assignments (those from the inventor to his or her
employer) if the assignment took place after the grant date. I use the name
standardization routines provided by the NBER Patent Data Project to identify
the type of assignor.20 All re-assignments that list an individual as the assignor
(as identified by the name standardization routine) are dropped. This reduces
the number of re-assigned patents to 42,712. However, due to the large number
of spelling variations it is not possible to identify internal transfers of patents
20Stata do files for the name standardization routines are available at
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject (accessed on 12/05/2011).
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Figure 1.3: Number of Re-Assignment Records by Year of Execution
Notes: The USPTO Assignment database contains 3,045,258 records for the time period 1980 to
2010. 2,848,200 records (93.5 percent) list “Assignment of Assignors Interest” as the reason for
conveyance. The next two most common reasons for conveyance are “Change of Name” (41,892
records; 1.4 percent) and “Corrective Assignment” (23,609 records; 0.8 percent). There are over
9,000 reasons for conveyance. The figure only shows the “Assignment of Assignors Interest”.
The date of recording a re-assignment is not necessarily the same as the execution date of a
re-assignment. For all re-assignments with the conveyance reason “Assignment of Assignors
Interest” recorded in 2008 (233,722 records), the execution date is on average 170 days before
the recording date. The data is therefore truncated, which needs to be taken into account in
particular when interpreting the most recent years in the above figure. Data on assignments
from the USPTO.
automatically. Instead, a manual analysis is required (see below).
The re-assignment records (one for each granted patent or patent applica-
tion) can be grouped into portfolios of patents based on the name of the as-
signee, the name of the assignor and the execution date of the deal. This groups
the 42,712 patents into 8,797 portfolios. Since several steps of the analysis cannot
be automated (such as the identification of internal transfer), I took a random
sample of 800 patent portfolios out of the population of 8,797 portfolios.
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A manual analysis of the assignee and assignor of these 800 patent portfo-
lios shows that 223 portfolios are re-assigned internally. In addition, 109 patent
portfolios list an individual as the assignee, but were missed by the name stan-
dardization routine. Excluding both of these portfolio types generates the ran-
dom sample of 468 patent portfolios containing 1,796 U.S. patents and patent
applications traded in 2005. At the time of trade in 2005, 1,430 patents out of
the 1,796 patents (80 percent) were already granted and the remaining 366 were
granted between the time of trade and December 31st, 2010.
Based on the 6 technology field definitions used above, 440 out of 1,796
patents and patent applications (24.5 percent) in the random sample are ‘Elec-
trical and Electronics’ patents. 435 (24.2 percent) are ‘Computers and Commu-
nication’ patents and 253 (14.1 percent) are ‘Drugs and Medical’ patents (Table
1.3).21 While a concentration of trades within a few industries is also observed
in the empirical literature on technology licensing, their composition differs. In
their analysis of the structure of licensing contracts, Anand and Khanna (2000)
find that almost 80 percent of licensing deals occur in either ‘Chemicals’ (in-
cluding drugs; 46 percent), ‘Electronic and Electrical Equipment’ (22 percent)
and ‘Industrial Machinery and Equipment’ (12 percent).
In order to identify, whether certain technology fields are over- or under-
represented in the current sample, one has to control for the distribution of
patents across technology fields in the total population of patents. The NBER
patent database contains information on the technology field of all U.S. utility
patents granted between 1976 and 2006 (Hall et al., 2001).22 The USPTO granted
21A more detailed breakdown of the technology fields based on 37 subcategories is provided
in the appendix (Table A.2).
22An update containing all granted patents until 2006 is available at:
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/patents.html (accessed on 12/05/2011).
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Table 1.6: Comparison of the Number of Claims per Patent by Technology
Field
Notes: Technology field definitions based on Hall et al. (2001).
1,867,475 patents between 1994 and 2006. Comparing the distribution of these
patents across technology fields with the SEC sample of 2,045 traded patents,
the random sample of 1,796 traded patents and the NBER data shows that there
exist significant differences between the three. Compared to the NBER data,
patents from the random sample in the fields ‘Computers and Communication’,
‘Drugs and Medical’ and ‘Electrical and Electronics’ are overrepresented, while
‘Chemicals (excl. Drugs)’, ‘Mechanical’ and ‘Others’ patents are underrepre-
sented (Table 1.3, columns (3) and (4)).
In order to identify differences between the patents in the random sample
and ‘the average patent’, I compare the number of claims in the random sample
with the number of claims per patent in the NBER patent data. The number
of claims per patent is significantly higher in the random sample (Table 1.6).
This difference in the number of claims, which cannot be explained with the
difference in the distribution across technology fields, points to a higher quality
of the average patent in the random sample compared to the average patent in
the total population.
The average patent in the random sample receives 4.66 citations from later
20
Table 1.7: Summary Statistics: Unit of Observation is a traded Patent Port-
folio, Random Sample
Notes: Number of citations is the number of citations received from subsequent U.S. patents within 5 years after the grant
date. Average patent age at execution is measured as the number of months between the application date and the execution
date. Technology field definitions based on Hall et al. (2001).
patents within 5 years after its grant date (Table 1.4). In comparison, the average
patent in the NBER patent data receives 3.0 citations within the first 5 years after
the patent grant (Hall et al., 2001).23 The average patent in the random sample
received a larger amount of citations compared to the average patent in the total
population, implying a higher quality of the patents in the sample.
In addition to patents, 73 out of the 468 deals (16 percent) included trade-
marks. The average number of trademarks per deal is 1.28 (Table 1.7).
23Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) provide a description of the initial NBER patent
data set. An update containing all patents and citations until 2006 was drawn from
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/patents.html. Calculations are based on the updated data
set.
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Data on annual revenues were obtained for all public companies in the sam-
ple from the Compustat database. For 107 out of 468 traded patent portfolios,
at least one of the two companies involved in the deal is a public company that
discloses information on annual revenues. For the remaining 361 traded patent
portfolios, neither the buying nor the selling company disclosed information on
annual revenues.
1.2.3 Litigation data
Aggregate data on patent litigation is available from the Statistics Division of
the U.S. Courts. The number of private patent cases per year increased from
1,165 in 1990 to 3,055 in 2004 and has remained around 3,000 since 2004 (Figure
1.4).24 Litigation data on individual patents is available from the IP Litigation
Clearinghouse (IPLC) database.25 This database contains information on patent
litigation from 2000 onwards. A manual search of the database for each of the
1,796 patents in the random sample was carried out covering the time period
between the time of the deal in 2005 and November 1st, 2011. If a patent was
sold and re-assigned once more at some point after 2005, only the time period
between the initial trade in 2005 and the second trade was considered.
24Data on private patent cases from the Judicial Facts and Figures 2005, 2009 and Judicial Busi-
ness of The U.S. Courts 1997, 1998, 1999, 2010 available at www.uscourts.gov/Statistics.aspx
(accessed on 09/27/2011). Data is available for the years 1990, 1995 and annually from 1997
onwards.
25Access to the IPLC database was provided by Lex Machina, Inc.
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Figure 1.4: Number of private Patent Cases filed (1990-2010)
Notes: Data from Judicial Facts and Figures 2005, 2009 and Judicial Business of The U.S. Courts 1997, 1998, 1999, 2010.
1.3 Results
1.3.1 Estimates of the market value of a traded patent and the
size of the market for patents
As a first (and potentially biased) estimate, I use the total market value of traded
patent portfolios divided by the number of granted patents and patent applica-
tions from the SEC sample as an estimate of the market value of traded patents.
The average patent has a value of $426,663 (Table 1.8, column 2). Since prices
are only observed at the portfolio level, it is not possible to obtain the full dis-
tribution of individual patent values. However, a lower bound for the maxi-
mum patent market value and an upper bound for the minimum patent market
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Table 1.8: Market Value of traded Patents and Patent Applications
Notes: In 2005 $.
value can still be obtained from the average patent value per portfolio.26 The
lower bound for the maximum patent market value (based on the SEC sample)
is $40,040,039 and the upper bound for the minimum value is $1,075 (Table 1.8,
column 2).
As mentioned above, the patent portfolio deals reported to the SEC might
not represent a random sample of all traded patents. In order to control for
selection and to derive estimates of the value of traded patents for the random
sample, I combine the SEC sample of 105 patent portfolios with the random
sample of 468 patent portfolios from the population of all traded portfolios and
estimate a Heckman selection model.
The main specification of the regression analysis is given by the following
equation:
ln (Pricej) = α + β1ln (1 +
∑
iCitationsij) + β2ln (1 +
∑
iClaimsij)
+β3Average patent agej + β4EUj + β5JPj + β6PAEj
+β7Trademarksj + γTechnology F ieldj + j
where ln (Pricej) is the natural logarithm of the real price of the traded
26The maximum over the average patent value per portfolio is a lower bound for the maxi-
mum patent market value. Similarly, the minimum over the average patent value per portfolio
is an upper bound for the minimum patent market value.
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patent portfolio j, Citationsij counts the number of later patents that cite patent
i belonging to patent portfolio j, Claimsij counts the number of claims of patent
i belonging to patent portfolio j, Average patent agej is measured as the aver-
age number of months between the application date and the execution date of
the patent transaction, EUj is the share of patents in the portfolio that have a
European patent application patent family member, JPj is the share of patents
in the portfolio that have a Japanese patent application patent family member,
PAEj is a dummy variable equal to one if the buyer of the patent portfolio j is
a patent assertion entity, Trademarksj is the number of trademarks traded in
addition to the patents and Technology F ieldj refers to the 5 technology fields
(“Computers and Communication” is the excluded category).
Table 1.9, column 1, gives the OLS estimates without controlling for possible
selection bias. A 10 percent increase in the number of citations leads to a 4.4
percent increase in the value of the traded portfolio (significant at the 1 percent
level). The sign of the coefficient of the number of claims is negative, but not
significant. The sign of the coefficient of the average patent age at the date of
execution is positive, but also not significant. The signs of the coefficients of
the share of European and Japanese patent family members are both positive as
expected, but also not significant. The coefficient on the dummy variable that
controls for the buyer of the portfolio being a PAE is negative, but not signifi-
cant. The coefficient of the number of trademarks is positive, but also not sig-
nificant. The technology field ‘Computers and Communication’ is the omitted
category. The coefficient of the technology field ‘Mechanical’ dummy variable is
positive and significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient of the technology
field ‘Other’ dummy variable is negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
The R2 is equal to 0.32.
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Table 1.9: Regression Results, Unit of Observation is a traded Patent Port-
folio, dependent Variable is ln (Price)
Notes: The omitted technology field is “Computers and Communication”. Technology field definitions based on Hall
et al. (2001). Number of citations is the number of citations received from subsequent U.S. patents within 5 years after
the grant date. Average patent age at execution is measured as the number of months between the application date and
the execution date.
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In order to control for selection bias, I estimate a Heckman selection model.
The outcome equation is the same as the one specified above. The selection
equation includes the same independent variables as the outcome equation with
the variable Reporting relevance added. For each company in the sample Report-
ing relevance captures whether the company is a public company and how rele-
vant the traded patent portfolio is compared to the size of the company.
Reporting relevancek = dk
Number of traded patentsj
Annual revenuek
where dk is a dummy variable equal to one if company k is a public company
and the second term gives the ratio of the number of patents traded in portfolio
j to the size of company k as measured by the annual revenue (in millions)
of company k in the year of the execution of the patent portfolio transaction.
For each deal j, I observe the reporting relevance for the buyer (company k)
as well as the seller (company l) of the patent portfolio. In order to aggregate
this information to the level of the unit of observation (i.e. the patent portfolio
deals), I define the reporting relevance for portfolio j as:
Reporting relevancej = max {Reporting relevancek, Reporting relevancel} .
Table 1.9, column 2 gives the estimates of the selection equation of the Heck-
man model. The coefficients on the number of claims and the average patent
age are positive and significant at the 1 percent and 5 percent level, respectively.
The coefficient of the dummy variable controlling for the buyer of the portfolio
being a PAE is positive and significant at the 1 percent level. Compared to the
baseline technology field (‘Computers and Communication’), portfolios with a
larger share of ‘Electrical and Electronics’ and ‘Other’ patents are less likely to
be reported, both significant at the 1 percent level.
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The coefficient of the participation variable (i.e. Reporting relevance) is posi-
tive and significant at the 1 percent level. The estimates for the outcome equa-
tion of the Heckman model are reported in table 1.9, column 3. A 10 percent
increase in the number of citations leads to a 4.4 percent increase in the value
of the traded portfolio (significant at the 1 percent level). With the exception of
the coefficient of the number of claims, none of the coefficients change their sign
compared to the OLS estimates and are similar in their magnitude.
The estimates of the coefficients of the outcome equation are used to derive
the predicted market values for the patent portfolios of the random sample. Fig-
ure 1.5 plots the actual values of the price for each portfolio of the SEC sample
versus the predicted value of the portfolio price.
The estimated mean value of a traded patent portfolio from the random sam-
ple is $1,938,231. The estimated mean patent value for a patent in the random
sample is $505,062 (Table 1.8, column 3).
To the best of my knowledge, there is no open access or subscription based
database on traded patent portfolios providing information on the value of the
portfolio or individual patents. While not offering access to the actual database,
ThinkFire, a patent brokerage firm, provides summary statistics on the 309
traded patent portfolios that compose the ThinkFire transaction database (2008
edition).27 The mean value of a traded patent family for patents traded between
2002 and 2008 is $383,000 (in nominal terms). Unfortunately, no additional in-
formation about the types of companies involved or the patent portfolios is pro-
vided and therefore it is not possible to condition on any of the characteristics
27Zaretzki (2009), Executive Vice President at ThinkFire, presented information about the
ThinkFire transaction database at the Berkeley Center for Law and Technology conference
on Theory and Practice of Patent Valuation in February 2009. Slides are available at
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/zaretzki.pdf (accessed on 12/05/2011).
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Figure 1.5: Actual versus predicted Price of the Patent Portfolio
Notes: Data on 105 traded patent portfolios from the SEC sample.
in my data set to carry out a more advanced comparison between the market
value estimates in the two different data sets.
Out of the total estimated value of $907,092,108 of patent portfolios in the
random sample, portfolios worth an estimated $34,547,114 (or 3.8 percent) are
acquired by PAEs (Table 1.10). Similarly to the SEC sample, the share of the
number of patents acquired by PAEs is larger than the share of the estimated
value of patents acquired by PAEs.
In order to provide estimates of the total market in 2005, the previous esti-
mates need to be scaled up from the size of the random sample of (initially) 800
observations to the size of the total market of 8,797 traded patent portfolios. The
total market in 2005 is estimated at $9,975 million. Portfolios worth an estimated
$379,888,702 are acquired by PAEs.
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Table 1.10: Significance of Patent Assertion Entities
Notes: Technology field definitions based on Hall et al. (2001).
Previous research on the role of PAEs allows for a plausibility check of the
estimated market value of portfolios acquired by PAEs. Bessen et al. (2011) pro-
vide estimates for the investment of 14 public PAEs in acquiring patents for the
time period 2000 to 2010. Given the total amount of $1.7 billion for the entire
time period, the average annual investment is about $155 million (about 41 per-
cent of my estimate of about $380 million). In comparing my estimates with
those of Bessen et al. (2011), one has to keep in mind that public PAEs are only
a subset of all PAEs.
1.3.2 Litigation of traded patents
Out of the 1,796 traded patents of the random sample, 27 are litigated during the
acquiring entity’s term of ownership. Since some of these patents are appearing
in more than one case, the total number of cases is larger at a total of 42 cases.
The litigation rate is 2.3 percent during the acquiring entity’s term of ownership.
Patents acquired by PAEs do not have an increased likelihood of being litigated
compared to other traded patents. Out of the 42 cases, only 3 cases involve
a PAE. The litigation rate for PAEs is 1.9 percent. However, given the small
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number of observations, the results have to be interpreted with care.
1.4 Conclusions
The chapter introduces a new data set of 105 patent portfolios consisting of 2,045
U.S. granted patents and patent applications traded among companies between
1990 and 2011 including information on the market value of these portfolios.
This data set is combined with a random sample of 468 patent portfolios con-
sisting of 1,796 U.S. granted patents and patent applications from the population
of all patent portfolios traded in 2005.
Contrary to the “conventional wisdom” that traded patents are of low value,
I find that the average patent traded in one of the portfolios from the random
sample has a market value of $505,062. The total size of the market for patents
is estimated at $9,975 million in 2005 and is significantly larger compared to
previous estimates. While significant in market size, the sale segment of the
market for technology is much smaller than the licensing segment.
Patents belonging to the technology fields ‘Computers and Communication’
and ‘Electrical and Electronics’ each account for over 24 percent of the traded
patents, followed by ‘Drugs and Medical’ patents, which account for about 14
percent.
Patent portfolios acquired by PAEs account for about $380 million or 3.8 per-
cent out of the total market. This points out the relatively small impact that
PAEs have on facilitating markets for technology and also highlights the lim-
ited importance that PAEs have in the market for patents. Any evaluation of
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public policy considering the ban of patent trades in order to prevent litigation
by PAEs must consider the negative impact with respect to the efficient alloca-
tion of new technologies of also banning the vast majority of trades that do not
include PAEs.
Traded patents are more likely to be litigated than non-traded patents. The
litigation rate for traded patents is 2.3 percent during the acquiring entity’s term
of ownership. However, patents acquired by PAEs do not have an increased
likelihood of being litigated compared to other traded patents.
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CHAPTER 2
PATENTS, CITATIONS, AND INVENTIVE OUTPUT: EVIDENCE FROM
HYBRID CORN
2.1 Introduction1
A common concern with patent data is that “inventions that are patented differ
greatly in ‘quality,’ in the magnitude of inventive output associated with them”
(Griliches, 1990, p. 1669). For example, Simon Kuznets (1962, p. 37) observes
that “the main difficulty with patent statistics is, of course, the enormous range
in the magnitude of the inventions covered.” Counts of citations received from
subsequently granted patents are the most commonly used measure to control
for the magnitude of patented inventions, but there is little systematic evidence
on the relationship between citations and the size of inventions. We use field
trial data for patented new corn hybrids to examine whether counts of citations
by later patents are a meaningful proxy for the size of innovative output. Specif-
ically, we match patented improvements in hybrid corn with field trial data for
new hybrids to measure the size of improvements in crop yields and revenues.
Corn is one of the world’s leading food crops, and has accounted for up to a
quarter of harvested acreage in the United States throughout much of the 20th
century. U.S. breeders began to hybridize corn seeds after 1908, when plant
scientists George H. Shull and Edward M. East crossbred two inbred (homozy-
gous) plants, and found that the first filial (F1) generation plant generated more
corn than open-pollinated varieties.2 Shull and East’s inbreds, however, were
1This chapter is based on joint research with Professors Petra Moser and Paul W. Rhode.
2Homozygous inbred plants carry the same alleles (forms) of a gene; they are simultaneously
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stunted and did not produce enough seeds to make their discovery commer-
cially viable. In 1917, Donald F. Jones created the first double cross (F2) hybrids
by crossing two F1 lines; Jones’ F2 hybrid out-performed open-pollinated va-
rieties and produced enough seeds to be commercially viable. In 1923, Henry
A. Wallace, who later founded the Pioneer Seed Company, introduced Copper
Cross, as one of the first commercial hybrid seeds.3 In 1933, hybrid seed was
planted on less than one percent of U.S. corn acreage. By 1939, its share had
risen to almost half. By 1960, nearly all U.S. corn acreage was hybrid seed
(Griliches, 1957, 1960; Olmstead and Rhode, 2008, pp. 64-67). Advances in
yields, which are the focus of this analysis, determined the onset and speed
of adoption (Griliches, 1957).4
Improvements in hybrid corn became subject to utility patents after 1980,
when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ananda M. Chakrabarty, a mi-
crobiologist at General Electric. Chakrabarty had developed the genetically-
engineered pseudomonas bacterium to break down crude oil into substances
that could serve as food for aquatic life, and was denied a patent by the USPTO.
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided that the pseudomonas bacterium should be
patentable because the "relevant distinction is not between living and inanimate
things" but between naturally existing and human-made substances (Diamond
female and male, and can therefore pollinate themselves and create identical offspring. When
two homozygous inbreds are crossed, all of the offspring share the same combination of alleles.
3Other early breeders include the Funk Brothers Seed Co. of Bloomington, Illinois, who
had marketed hybrid corn seeds in 1916 and the Connecticut Agricultural Experiment Station,
which had sold hybrid corn in 1921 (Funk Bros. Seed Co., 1940; Fitzgerald, 1990). In the 1960s
and 1970s, improvements in inbred plants and methods of cultivation increased yields from F1
plants sufficiently to allow breeders to market F1 instead of F2 lines (Kloppenburg, 2004, Sutch,
2008). Today F1 seeds account for nearly all corn seed planted in the United States.
4Griliches (1957) examines cross-sectional differences in the use of hybrid seed corn and ex-
plains differences in the lag with which seed producers adopt hybrid corn based on market
density and marketing costs. Griliches (1960) documents that adoption followed an S-shaped
growth curve across regions: the rate of adoption was slow at first, accelerated to a peak at
approximately mid-point, and then decelerated.
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vs. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)). In 1985, the USPTO de facto extended
utility patents to sexually propagated plants, such as hybrid corn (Ex parte Hi-
bberd, 227 USPQ 443 Bd. Pat. App. & Int).5 This unilateral decision by the
USPTO was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2001, when the Court de-
cided that the same seed could be protected simultaneously by a utility patent
and a plant variety protection certificate, an alternative type of intellectual prop-
erty rights (IPRs), which the Plant Variety Protection Act had created in 1970 to
provide IPRs for seeds (J.E.M. Ag Supply vs. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, 534
U.S. 124).6
5Ex parte Hibberd established that corn plants are patentable under regulation 35 U.S.C. 101,
which states that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, man-
ufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” Regulation 35 U.S.C.
112 specifies the requirements for reporting: the “specification shall contain a written descrip-
tion of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”
6On December 24, 1970, Congress passed the Plant Variety Protection (PVP) Act, which au-
thorized the US Department of Agriculture to issue PVP certificates, which provide exclusive
marketing rights for new varieties of sexually propagated plants (seeds) that are “uniform, sta-
ble, and distinct from all other varieties.” In contrast to utility patents, PVP certificates are nar-
rower, covering only one variety, and they include no claims. PVP certificates also do not allow
breeders to prevent competitors from using a new variety in their breeding program. Fungi, bac-
teria, and first-generation (F1) hybrids were initially excluded from PVP protection (Strachan,
2004). Distinctness requires that the variety differs by one or more identifiable morphological,
physiological, or other characteristics (which may include processing or product characteristics,
such as, milling and baking characteristics in the case of wheat); uniformity implies that any
variations are describable, predictable and commercially acceptable; and stability in the sense
that the variety, when sexually reproduced or reconstituted, will remain unchanged with regard
to its essential and distinctive characteristics with a reasonable degree of reliability (7 U.S.C. Sec.
2401 cited in U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Delta Pine vs. Peoples’ Gin 694 F.2d 1012 Jan.
3, 1983). A 1994 Amendment to the PVP Act extended PV protection to F1 seeds. Varieties that
have been sold or used in the United States for more than 1 year or abroad for more than 4 years
are also ineligible. PVP certificates remain in effect for 18 years from the date of issue. Breed-
ers are required to submit 2,500 sample seeds (with germination rates of at least 85) when the
application is filed, these sample seeds are stored at the National Seed Storage Laboratory in Ft.
Collins, CO (Strachan, 2004). In 1992, protection required a filing fee of $250 and an examination
fee of $1,900, as well as the deposit of 2,500 viable seeds (Strachan, 2004). “The ‘importance’ or
‘value’ of characteristics to the productivity of the crop are not considered when making novelty
decisions. Therefore, ‘cosmetic’ traits, those which do not contribute to the productivity of the
crop, can be used to distinguish among varieties. Some breeders argue that basing judgments
on cosmetic traits trivializes a PVP certificate” (Strachan, 2004). Breeders do not appear to use
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The USPTO granted the first utility patent for a corn hybrid on August 26,
1986. Until 2005, all patents for hybrid corn reported field trial data on yields
in bushels per acre and moisture levels.7 Yields are the bottom-line measure
for improvements. Data on yields in combination with data on moisture levels
allow farmers to calculate the expected revenue from new hybrids: Moisture
levels above 15 percent decrease the value of corn by increasing drying costs
and the risk of spoilage.8
The reported field trial data for 256 patented corn hybrids indicate that most
patented corn hybrids produced less corn than comparable hybrids that were
already in production: 58 percent of patented hybrids between 1986 and 2005
produce less corn than the highest-yielding comparison hybrids; 56 percent gen-
erate less income. 23 percent of patented hybrids produce less corn than the av-
erage comparison hybrid. On average, patented hybrids yield one percent less
corn and one percent less income than the highest-yielding existing hybrids.
Field trial data also indicate that the size of improvements in yields and in-
come decline over time. More than 70 percent of hybrids patented after 1998
produce less corn than existing varieties, compared with 47 percent before 1998,
and more than 63 percent produce less income after 1998, compared with 53
before 1998.9 On average, hybrids that were patented between 1998 and 2005
PVPs to protect first or second generation hybrid corn: By November 2008, Pioneer had applied
for 549 PVP certificates, but all of them cover inbred lines rather than hybrids.
7One firm changed their reporting practices on their patent applications, affecting patents
granted from 2005 onwards. See below for further details.
8See Uhrig and Maier (1992) for a detailed discussion of the effects of moisture. Other charac-
teristics influence the quality of hybrid corn seeds primarily through their effects on yields: time
to maturity, resistance to pest and diseases, drought-tolerance, and adaptability to soil quality.
Field trials control for such characteristics by growing comparable crops under identical condi-
tions. In addition to yields and moisture, we also collect data on variation in the relative matu-
rity of hybrid corn. The naming practices used by Pioneer for its hybrid corn seeds reveal the
relative maturity levels (www.pioneer.com/home/site/ca/products/product-naming-system,
accessed on 12/05/2011).
9A total of 134 hybrids were patented up to 1998 and 122 hybrids between 1999 and 2005.
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yield two percent less corn and two percent less income than existing hybrids.
Controlling for alternative factors, including variation in the number of days
that hybrids need to mature, or in disease resistance, cannot explain these re-
sults. Most importantly, corn hybrids vary according to the climatic conditions
that they require to thrive, and in particular in the number of days with ade-
quate growing conditions that they require to mature (e.g. Griliches, 1957, 1960;
Hicks and Thomison, 2004, pp. 482-484 and 493-495).10 As a first cut, we col-
lected information on variation in the relative maturity of Pioneer hybrids be-
tween 1997 and 2005, when the company encoded information on relative ma-
turity in the names of new seeds. These data indicate no systematic changes in
relative maturity over time. The average hybrid corn plant in our data has a
relative maturity index of 5.03 before 1998, 5.31 after 1998 and 5.19 across the
sample on a scale from 0 to 9 (ranging from ’very full’ to ’very short’ relative
maturity), with no discernible decrease in maturity over time.11
10Guidelines for selecting hybrid corn recommend that farmers first “select hybrids with ma-
turity ratings appropriate for your geographic area or circumstances” to allow corn to reach
physiological maturity before the first frost that kills it. Then, “Step 2, Choose hybrids with
consistently high yields across a number of locations and/or over years [. . . ] Choosing a hy-
brid because it possesses a particular trait, such as big ears, many kernel rows, deep kernels, or
upright leaves will not ensure high yields; instead, look for stability in performance across envi-
ronments.” (“Steps for Selecting Hybrid Corn”, Ohio State Extension, Publication AGF 125-95,
http://ohioline.osu.edu/agf-fact/0125.html, accessed 06/16/2011).
11Another omitted characteristic of corn hybrids relates to the sugar content of corn, which
increases the value of harvested corn per weight. We focus on field corn (as opposed to garden
variety sweet corn or popcorn), which accounts for more than 98 percent of acreage and nearly
all research activity of large commercial breeders. However, the sugar content also became
an important issue for field corn after 2005 when the Renewable Fuel Program of the Energy
Policy Act mandated renewable fuel use in gasoline, which is typically corn-based, to reach
7.5 billion gallons by calendar year 2012 (nearly double compared with 2005 levels; Westcott,
2007). In 2005/06 ethanol accounted for 14 percent of U.S. production in field corn, compared
with 55 percent for animal feed (Westcott, 2007). Corn-based ethanol production had increased
gradually from 1.6 billion gallons in 2000/01 to 3.5 billion gallons in 2005/06, but was expected
to increase to nearly 8 billion gallons by 2015/16. As a result, the share of ethanol in corn use
was projected to increase drastically, and without being anticipated by the USDA and breeders,
after 2006 to 31 percent by 2016/17 (Westcott, 2007), leading to an increase in the price of corn,
and more than likely also shifting R&D efforts towards crops with high sugar-content. Hybrids
in our data, which include patent grants only until 2005, were not affected by this policy change.
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These results suggest that plant breeders may use utility patents for strategic
reasons, to protect themselves from litigation or to extract licensing revenues.
In the hybrid corn sector, rapid increases in patenting coincide with a period of
consolidation when Monsanto acquired nearly all plant breeders in the industry
except Pioneer. In February 1996, Monsanto formed a joint venture with DeKalb
Genetics, acquiring a 40 percent stake in the producer of hybrid corn seed (New
York Times, Feb. 2, 1996, p. D4). In late September 1996, Monsanto began the
process of acquiring Asgrow, its partner in developing Roundup-Ready soy-
beans, and a seed company with a long history in developing vegetables, and
most recently soybeans (New York Times, Sept. 25, 1996, p. D3, Fernandez-
Cornejo, 2004, pp. 31, 34).12 The transaction was completed by 1998 and they
soon began to market Roundup-ready hybrid corn, which could withstand the
application of Monsanto’s powerful Roundup (glyphosate) herbicide to destroy
weeds. In January 1997, Monsanto agreed to purchase Holden’s Foundation
Seeds for one billion dollars (Charles, 2001, p. 197; New York Times, Jan. 7,
1997, p. D8).13 On May 11, 1998, Monsanto announced that it would pay $2.3
12Asgrow was amenable to a partnership with Monsanto, because its researchers had created
squash that was engineered to resist a virus, and required a fragment of DNA, the 35S promoter
that Monsanto researchers had isolated and patented in the 1980s; Monsanto paid $240 million
for Asgrow’s corn and soybean business, and Asgrow acquired the rights to use the 35S pro-
moter (Charles, 2001, p. 195). “Monsanto’s acquisition of Agrow, and its restrictive contracts
with many other smaller seed companies, forced people to radically revise their estimates of
what germplasm was worth. It appeared that elite germ plasm was just as rare and difficult to
create from scratch as new and valuable genes. Seed companies never had earned substantial
profits. But it suddenly became clear to many in the industry that they had become very valu-
able indeed. Control over seed companies meant access to billion-dollar markets.“ (Charles,
2001, p. 197)
13Charles (2001, pp. 198-199) describes the importance of Holden’s Seed Foundation: “Until
the 1960s the nation’s mom-and-pop seed companies had relied on breeding programs at agri-
cultural universities, which regularly distributed, free of charge, new corn hybrids. But those
publicly funded breeding programs gradually fell behind the efforts of Pioneer and DeKalb and
closed down. Ron Holden stepped into the gap. Holden’s maintained a small but well-run
breeding program that delivered new ‘inbred’ lines that became the parents of hybrid seed sold
by family-owned seed distributors all over the country. The smaller companies often relied ex-
clusively on Holden’s for their seed stock; larger enterprises such as Golden Harvest or Dobelers
or even DeKalb used parental lines from Holden’s to supplement their own breeding programs.
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billion for the remainder of DeKalb; the transaction was completed on Decem-
ber 1, 1998 (New York Times, May 12, 1998, p. D2; Dec. 1, 1998, p. C4). In 1997,
Monsanto introduced the DeKalb’s YieldGard hybrid corn, which is resistant to
the European corn borer.
After 1997, only two major players remained in the industry, Monsanto and
Pioneer, which had resisted Monsanto’s attempts of purchasing it. In August
1997, Du Pont acquired a 20 percent stake in Pioneer; in October 1999, Du Pont
purchased the remaining 80 percent (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004, p. 33).
In 1999, Pioneer held 42 percent of the seed market, compared with Mon-
santo’s share of 12 percent (Figure B.1). In 2003, Pioneer introduced its first
bio-engineered hybrid; Herculex, which was resistant to the European corn
borer. By mid-2004, however, Monsanto had pushed ahead of Pioneer as a mar-
ket leader (Fernandez-Cornejo, 2004), possibly fueled by “surging crop prices,
which allowed farmers to buy the latest bug-resistant, herbicide-tolerant corn”
(Associated Press, August 25, 2010).14
If breeders patent for strategic reasons, and many patents do not improve
on prior art, measures for the quality of patented inventions become particu-
larly important (e.g., Griliches, 1990, p. 1669). With the availability of electronic
data sets like the NBER patent citations data (Hall et al., 2001), counts of cita-
tions by later patents have emerged as the standard measure of patent quality.15
There is however, to date no quantitative evidence to prove that citations are
Only Pioneer refused to use any material from Holden’s. When one added it all up, corn lines
from Holden’s were the immediate ancestors for 40 percent of all the corn grown in the United
States.”
14In 2010, DuPont devoted half of its $1.4 billion research budget to agriculture, compared
with Monsanto’s $1.1 billion budget (Associated Press, August 25, 2010).
15An update containing all granted patents until 2006 is available at:
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/patents.html (accessed on 12/05/2011).
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positively correlated with the magnitude of improvements, which typically can-
not be measured. Instead, existing studies compare citations counts with other
measures of the “importance” of patents. Most prominently, Trajtenberg (1990)
showed that citations counts are positively correlated with the estimated social
surplus that 456 improvements in CAT scanners created over time.
Carpenter et al. (1981) compare citations for 100 “important” patents be-
tween 1969 and 1974 with 102 control patents that had been issued in the same
year. In their study, important patents are defined as patents that they matched
with “the 100 most significant technical products” selected by the journal In-
dustrial and Research Development in 1969 and 1970. These 100 patents were
cited 494 times between 1968 and 1974, compared with 102 control patents that
were cited only 208 times, implying that an “important” patent received 4.94
citations on average compared to 2.04 citations for the average patent from the
control group.
Similarly, Albert et al. (1991) find a strong association between the number
of citations counts and the technical importance of 77 silver halide technology
patents granted between 1982 and 1983. Their measure of technical importance
is based on the expert opinion of 20 researchers and research managers at East-
man Kodak, all of whom were working in the area of silver halide technology.
Citations are also positively correlated with changes in the stock market val-
uations of firms that own the cited patents (Hall et al., 2005).
Field trial data for hybrid corn establish a positive and statistically signif-
icant relationship between counts of citations and the magnitude of improve-
ments in patented plants. For example, OLS and negative binomial regressions
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imply that a 10 percentage point increase in yields is associated with 1.9 addi-
tional citations; a 10 percentage point increase in income is associated with 2.5
additional citations when the comparison is made with respect to the highest-
yielding comparison hybrid. A 10 percentage point increase in yields is associ-
ated with 2.4 additional citations when the comparison is made with respect to
the average comparison hybrid. Results are robust to controlling for the age of
patents, time- and firm-fixed effects, linear and quadratic time trends.
Each patent document includes a number of claims that define the scope of
the patent. Empirical analysis have used the number of claims as a proxy for
the breadth of patents (e.g., Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001), and claims have
been proposed as an additional, complementary measure for the importance of
patented inventions (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). The number of claims
per utility patent of hybrid corn increases over time even though the size of im-
provements becomes smaller, as breeders add claims to their own, firm-specific
templates of patent applications.
We also compare citations with renewal data as an alternative measure of
patent quality.16 Schankerman and Pakes (1986) use renewal data for U.K.,
French, and German patents between 1950 and 1979 to estimate the value of
patented inventions. Renewal data for U.S. patents between 1985 and 1991 in-
dicates that renewals and citations are highly correlated (Bessen, 2008). Among
256 corn hybrids in our sample, 98 percent were renewed after four years. Simi-
larly, nearly all patents for which we observe the renewal decision after eight
and eleven years were also renewed, suggesting that renewal decisions are
16In addition, data on prize-winning innovations (Moser, 2012) have been proposed as mea-
sures for the quality of patents. To the best of our knowledge, no comparable data can be
collected for corn hybrids. All-American Seed Selection Prizes are awarded to garden varieties
for sweet corn, but no reliable data exist on prize-winning in field corn.
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made independent of the size of the improvement of the protected corn hybrid.
We also test whether breeders strategically choose field trials that maximize
the magnitude of their improvements. To measure this, we link two patented
hybrids that are not directly compared to one another through at least one other
comparison hybrid that is included in both patent applications. A total of 172
patented hybrids can be paired with existing hybrids. These indirect compar-
isons are subject to more measurement error than field trials that are directly
reported on patent documents and were conducted under identical growing
conditions, but results are suggestive. In indirect comparisons, only 35 percent
of patented hybrids produce more corn and 35 percent generate more income
than existing hybrids.
2.2 Utility patents for corn hybrids
Our data consist of 256 utility patents for hybrid corn granted between August
26, 1986 and March 8, 2005. All of these patents include field trial data, including
information on yields and moisture of the new corn hybrid in comparison to
already established corn hybrids. In 2002, Pioneer, one of the two large firms
in the industry, stopped reporting moisture levels as a share of total weight on
its patent applications. Since this information is needed to calculate the income
per acre of a corn hybrid, we restrict our data to all hybrid corn patents with
an application date up to September 9, 2002 (which corresponds to the granting
dates August 26, 1986 to March 8, 2005). This window of analysis precedes the
Energy Policy Act of July 29, 2005 (Pub.L. 109-58), which mandated an increase
in the amount of bio-fuel in U.S. gasoline. Since ethanol is typically produced
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from corn, the Act increased the price of corn, and raised the value of corn with
extremely high sugar content; this change in relative prices may have changed
the direction of innovation.
For patents granted up to 2005, we can observe citations for a minimum of
five years, which is how long it takes for annual counts of citations in the NBER
patent data set to reach their highest level (Hall et al., 2001). Application dates
for patent grants between August 26, 1986 and March 8, 2005 range from Febru-
ary 21, 1985 to September 9, 2002. The average patent grant occurs 28 months
after the application, with a median of 24 months and a standard deviation of
15 months. We use application dates to measure the timing of invention.
Between August 26, 1986 and March 8, 2005, the United States Patent
and Trademark Office granted a total of 1,181 utility patents in the subclass
800/320.1 maize. We focus on field corn (as opposed to garden variety sweet
corn or popcorn), which accounts for more than 98 percent of acreage and nearly
all research activity of large commercial breeders.17 A total of 256 patents in this
subclass cover inventions in hybrid field corn; 118 of these patents cover both
a hybrid and at least one parent inbred plant. For example, USPTO 6,864,409,
assigned to DeKalb, states “inbred wddq1 has been used to prepare an F1 hy-
brid corn plant, designated dk642,” and compares dk642 with established hy-
brids.18 An additional 488 patents cover inbred corn lines only. Other patents
assigned to the subclass maize include genetic modifications, such as the “termi-
nator gene” for “Methods for maintaining sterility in plants” (USPTO 5,717,129).
17In 2007, U.S. farmers harvested 93,527,000 acres of field corn, compared with 622,946 acres
of sweet corn, and 201,623 acres of popcorn (USDA, NASS, 2007 Census of Agriculture, Tables
33 and 34, available at www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full_Report/index.asp; as-
sessed on 12/03/2011).
18The hybrid dk642 is included in the data; it yields 6.55 percent more corn than the estab-
lished hybrid dk636. USPTO 6,864,409 includes 29 claims and covers 10 additional hybrids;
hybrid dk636 is covered by 2 additional patents and cited by 4 later patents.
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A total of 245 patents for corn hybrids (96 percent) list subclass maize as their
primary subclass. The remaining 11 patents list subclass maize as a secondary
subclass.19 In comparison, 68 percent of the 488 patents for inbred corn lines list
subclass 800/320.1 as their primary subclass compared with only 14 percent of
437 patents for ‘other’ inventions.
In addition to claims, the number of hybrids that are covered by the same
patent, as well as the number of other patents that cover the same hybrid can
be used as measures for the scope or breadth of patents; our regressions include
these measures as alternative controls and use a single patent as the unit of
observation.
There does not exist a one-to-one match between a single patent and a single
hybrid. A single patent can protect one or multiple hybrids. The average patent
in our data covers 1.25 hybrids, but a small number of patents cover up to 10
hybrids.20 Similarly, a single hybrid can be covered by multiple patents.21 The
average hybrid is covered by 1.2 patents (Table 2.1) and there is one case in
which one hybrid is covered by 3 patents.22
19Out of these 11 patents, 7 patents list subclass 800/271 Method of using a plant or plant part in
a breeding process which includes a step of sexual hybridization - Method of breeding using gametophyte
as the primary subclass and there is one patent each that lists subclass 800/263 Method of using
a plant or plant part in a breeding process which includes a step of sexual hybridization - Breeding for
altered carbohydrate composition, subclass 800/267 Method of using a plant or plant part in a breeding
process which includes a step of sexual hybridization - Molecular marker is used, subclass 800/274
Via a male sterility genetic trait, and subclass 800/275 Method of using a plant or plant part in a
breeding process which includes a step of sexual hybridization - Method of breeding maize as the primary
subclass.
20There exists significant variation between firms. While Pioneer patents always only cover
one hybrid, DeKalb patents cover between 1 and 10 hybrids with an average of 1.37 hybrids per
patent.
21An example of a hybrid that is covered by more than one patent is given by DeKalb’s hybrid
dk714, which is protected by the USPTO patents 6,359,200 and 6,380,467.
22The average Pioneer hybrid is protected by 1.02 patents, while the average DeKalb hybrid
is covered by 1.35 patents.
49
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Notes: Five outliers have exceptionally high citation counts (136,137, 139, 212, and 551). Data on yields were collected by
a manual search of the full text of patent documents in subclass 800/320.1 Maize available at www.uspto.gov. Data on
income per acre incorporate information on the moisture content of a new hybrid in addition to its yield. Calculations
use $2.25 per bushel of corn and drying costs of $0.04 per percent moisture above 15%. Price data from the United
States Department of Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service, available at www.nass.usda.gov. Direct
comparisons are read directly from the full text of patent documents; indirect comparisons are measured by linking the
new hybrid through at least one other hybrid with a third hybrid that is not listed on the patent for the new hybrid.
Year of application uses 1985 as the base year. The average patent covers 1.25 hybrids, but a small number of patents
cover up to 10 hybrids; the variable # of hybrids covered by the patent includes for such variation. Similarly, the average
hybrid is covered by 1.2 patents, but one hybrid is covered by 3 patents; the variable # of other patents covering this
hybrid, controls for such variation.
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Figure 2.1: Utility Patents in Subclass 800/320.1 Maize by Year of Applica-
tion
Notes: Data include all 1,181 patents that were granted in subclass 800/320.1 Maize (available at www.uspto.gov) be-
tween January 1, 1985 and March 8, 2005. 256 patents are granted for hybrid corn. Some breeders stop to record
comparable data for hybrid corn after March 8, 2005. For corn hybrids, the figure also shows all patents granted up to
October 31, 2010 (when the data was collected).
2.2.1 Applications for utility patents protecting hybrid corn
Between 1985 and 1993, only a handful of breeders applied for utility patents
for hybrid corn each year (Figure 2.1, utility patents for corn, granted by March
2005, measured at the date of application). In 1994, the number of hybrid corn
patents increased rapidly to 13 patents, including seven applications by Pioneer,
five by DeKalb, and one by Sandoz. In 1995, the number of patent applications
dipped to seven (all assigned to Pioneer). After 1995, the number of patent
applications increased smoothly to reach 55 in 1999. After 1999, patent applica-
tions for corn hybrids declined to 29 in 2000, and 31 in 2001. The low number
of patent applications in 2002 is due to truncation (as explained above, only
patents granted by 2005 are included in our data). Expanding the data to in-
clude patents granted by October 2010 increases the number of applications to
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33 (instead of seven) in 2002, 29 (instead of zero) in 2003, 30 (instead of zero) in
2004, and 67 (instead of zero) in 2005.
Time trends in patenting for inbreds and other inventions closely mirror time
trends in patenting for hybrid corn, with slightly larger numbers of applications
for inbred corn lines and other inventions in hybrid corn in all years. Patents for
inbred corn lines reach 13 for the first time in 1989, when Pioneer applied for 12
patents and Holden’s Foundations Seeds applied for one patent. After a brief
dip to six application in 1990, application for inbred corn lines increase to 19 in
1993 and 18 in 1994.
Interestingly, the onset of increasing numbers of patent applications for in-
breds and other inventions precedes the onset of increasing numbers for corn
hybrids, by two years, reaching a first peak of 52 patents for other inventions
in 1995 and 62 patents for inbred patents in 1996. After a brief dip in 1996 and
1997 respectively, patents for inbred corn and other inventions reach another
local peak with 70 and 91 patents respectively in 1999, and decline afterward.
2.2.2 Breeders’ rationale to patent corn hybrids
The delayed onset of patenting is consistent with archival evidence on internal
deliberations within the American Seed Trade Association (ASTA), which reveal
that breeders of hybrid corn initially opposed the creation of formal property
rights for sexually-propagated plants. In debates leading up to the Plant Vari-
ety Protection (PVP) Act of 1970, breeders of hybrid corn argued that patents
would not benefit invention (Kloppenburg, 2004). Intuitively, breeders of hy-
brids may be less dependent on formal protection ex ante because the desirable
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characteristics of a hybrid do not appear reliably in offspring, and typically can-
not be replicated without access to the parent (inbred) lines.23
Data on plant variety protection (PVP) certificates confirm that corn breed-
ers also delayed adopting this alternative type of property right until the early
1980s, while breeders of soybeans began to apply for PVP certificates as early
as 1971; in the 1990s, counts of PVP certificates per year converged for the two
crops (Dhar and Foltz, 2007).
If secrecy provides an effective alternative, why did breeders of corn hy-
brids begin to use patents? One potential explanation is that the effectiveness
of informal protection declined as breeding programs became more systematic
and some breeders began to patent inbreds that they had developed based on
their rivals’ hybrids.24 For example, one of the first patent grants to DeKalb
(USPTO 4,594,810 granted June 17, 1986) covers a new inbred corn line, which
DeKalb had developed by crossing two unpatented hybrid lines of Pioneer. An-
other patent grant to DeKalb in the same year covers the hybrid dk672 (USPTO
4,607,453; granted August 26, 1986), which DeKalb developed by crossing its
own inbred HBA1 with B73Ht, an inbred “developed by Iowa State [...] avail-
able to the public.” In 1995, DeKalb was granted another patent for a cross be-
tween its own inbred MBUB and B73 HT, “a public line available through Iowa
State University" (USPTO 5,444,177; granted August 22, 1995). In 1999, DeKalb’s
23This is consistent with historical evidence on an increase in the share of chemical innova-
tions that firms chose to patent in response to an exogenous decrease in the effectiveness of
secrecy. Analysis of exhibition data indicate that the large majority of 19th century inventions
(more than 80 percent) were not patented and that patenting rates varied strongly across indus-
tries. Patenting rates for chemical innovations increased after scientific advances lowered the
effectiveness of secrecy, both over time and relative to other industries (Moser, 2012). For con-
temporary firms, survey data indicate that firms in most industries, except for pharmaceuticals,
prefer secrecy to patenting (e.g. Cohen et al., 2000).
24Taba et al. (2004, p. 104), however, state “It is extremely difficult to extract an inbred line
once it has been hybridized.”
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inbred 3000200 (USPTO 5,969,212; granted October 19, 1999) incorporated mate-
rial from Pioneer hybrid 3475 and Holden Foundation Seeds, LH 132; DeKalb’s
inbred 5014422 (USPTO 5,994,631; granted November 30, 1999) included Pio-
neer’s hybrid 3293 as one parent.25
Breeders appear to incorporate both patented and unpatented varieties of
rivals in the new lines that they develop. For example, DeKalb’s inbred 01CSI6
(USPTO 5,777,196; granted July 7, 1998) is a descendent of the Pioneer hybrid
3779; DeKalb’s inbred 2003929 (USPTO 5,856,614; granted January 5, 1999) is
a descendent of the Pioneer hybrids 3615 and 3790 (USPTO 4,731,499; granted
March 15, 1988).
2.2.3 Enforcement of patents for hybrid corn
Data on patent infringement cases from 2000 to present shows that none of the
patents for hybrid corn in our data were part of patent litigation.26 However,
this is not to say that breeders do not enforce their patent rights. Monsanto
states that as of October 10th, 2008, it has gone to trial over seed patents (not
limited to hybrid corn) eight times, filed 128 law suits and settled about 700
times out-of-court.27
25In comparison, most conventional (non-GMO) hybrids include genetic material from a
small number of open-pollinated varieties such as Reid.
26LexMachina provides access to every electronically available patent infringement case and
docket event from 2000 to the present. Out of 256 patents for hybrid corn only one patent
is mentioned in the documents available through the LexMachina database. By mistake, the
defendant Mercedes-Benz of USA, LLC refers to patent USPTO 6,452,076 (“Inbred corn plant
7180 and seeds thereof”) instead of USPTO 6,542,076 (“Control, monitoring and/or security
apparatus and method”) in their “answer and counterclaim” in case no. 8:10-CV-01909 DOC.
27See company website: www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/Settling-the-Matter-Part-
5.aspx (accessed on 12/02/2011). As of April, 2010, the number of lawsuits filed
increased to 144 and the number of cases that have gone through full trial in-
creased to 9 (www.monsanto.com/newsviews/Pages/why-does-monsanto-sue-farmers-who-
save-seeds.aspx, accessed on 12/02/2011). However, Monsanto’s website does not report up-
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2.3 Field trial data on improvements in yields, moisture, and
other characteristics
Since 1985, breeders of hybrid corn have adopted the practice of including infor-
mation from field trials, including yields and moisture levels, in their patent ap-
plicants. Breeders report these comparisons voluntarily to establish the novelty
of their plants, and they are able to choose the comparison plants. The USPTO
does not check information in patent applications but misrepresentations would
immediately invalidate a patent and breeders can count on competitors to con-
duct competing trials to verify their reports (Interview with Patent Examiner
Gary Benzion, October 26, 2009). We will show below that changes in yields
over time match changes in average yields in the United States, but also report
evidence to suggest that breeders choose comparison plants strategically to in-
crease the size of their improvements.
Field trials compare the performance of pairs of hybrids under identical
growing conditions and in the same location. Field trials are carried out in
a variety of locations. On the patent document, locations are typically listed
as “all the hybrids’ adapted growing areas” (USPTO 5,502,272 for Pioneer hy-
brid 3563) or “locations around the United States” (USPTO 5,449,855 for DeKalb
hybrid dk743). Among the 256 patents in our sample, only 2 include explicit
data on locations. Field trials for Pioneer’s USPTO 4,731,499 (Pioneer hybrid
3790) were conducted in 8 test station across 6 U.S. states and one Canadian
province: Bowling Green, Ohio; Woodstock, Ontario, Canada; Willmar, Min-
nesota; Huron, South Dakota; Janesville, Wisconsin; Alma, Michigan; Mankato,
Minnesota; and North Platte, Nebraska. Tests for Pioneer’s USPTO 4,737,596
dated information about the number of conflicts settled out-of-court.
55
(Pioneer hybrid 3471) were conducted in 13 tests stations across 9 states: John-
ston, Iowa; Princeton, Illinois; Algona, Iowa; Bowling Green, Ohio; Carrollton,
Missouri; Garden City, Kansa; Huron, South Dakota; Marion, Iowa; New Hol-
land, Pennsylvania; North Platte, Nebraska; Shelbyville, Illinois; Windfall, In-
diana; and York, Nebraska. An additional four patents report only the number
of locations for their field trials, without revealing locations: USPTO 6,506,964;
6,506,965; and 6,512,167 – all assigned to Rustica Prograin Genetique – report
that performance data are based on “multilocation analysis of 15 locations.”
USPTO 6,646,188, assigned to Euralis, reports “multi-location analysis in 19 lo-
cations”.
Yields are reported as bushels harvested per acre planted, normalized to
a moisture level of 15.5 percent. Moisture levels are reported as the share of
weight at harvest that is water. Corn at harvest has a high moisture level, espe-
cially following rain or an early frost. Corn with high moisture levels at harvest
is costly to dry or rots in storage, and as a result sells at a discount beyond the
actual share of corn that is water. To reduce moisture, farmers use fans and
heaters to dry the corn. Corn has to be dried in a slow process at low heat to
avoid cooking so that farmers typically incur additional inventory costs (Uhrig
and Maier, 1992). In addition to moisture levels, other characteristics of hy-
brid corn, such as time to maturity, resistance to pest and diseases, drought-
tolerance, and adaptability to soil quality are captured indirectly through their
effects on yields.
To measure income, we follow the standard practice of assuming a price of
$2.25 per bushel of corn and a drying cost of $0.04 per percentage point moisture
above 15 percent.28 For example, Pioneer’s new hybrid 3375 (USPTO 5,576,472
28Price data from the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, available at
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Figure 2.2: Two Examples of Patents for Hybrid Corn
Notes: Example of 2 out of the 256 patents granted for new hybrids in subclass 800/320.1 Maize between January 1, 1985
and March 8, 2005 (available at www.uspto.gov). Included in the patent document are pair-wise comparisons between
the newly patented hybrid and an earlier, already established, hybrid. The comparisons include information about the
yield of these two hybrids (measured in bushels per acre (in absolute terms) – abbreviated as BU ACR ABS).
granted on November 19, 1996, Figure 2.2, left patent) yields 181.1 bushels per
acre and has a moisture level of 21.9 percent. This implies an income per acre
of $407.20. In comparison, Pioneer’s existing hybrid 3394 yields 172 bushels per
acre and has a moisture level of 20.5 percent. This implies an income per acre of
$386.78 (Figure 2.2, left patent). Comparing these two hybrid reveals an increase
in income per acre of 5.28 percent.
We use two types of comparisons to measure the magnitude of improve-
ments in hybrid corn, self-reported and indirect comparisons. In self-reported
comparisons, breeders report field trial comparisons with existing hybrids. For
example, Pioneer’s new hybrid 3375 (USPTO 5,576,472, Figure 2.2, left patent)
www.nass.usda.gov.
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Table 2.2: Improvements in Yield and Income per Acre
Notes: An observation consists of a utility patent protecting a new hybrid. Data on yields were collected by a search
of patents in subclass 800/320.1 Maize (available at www.uspto.gov). On the patent document breeders compare their
new hybrid to existing hybrids to demonstrate that the new hybrid is a patentable improvement. To be patentable, new
hybrids must be novel, useful, and non-obvious. To control for improvements in addition to yields, measures of income
per acre incorporate information on the moisture content of hybrids. To calculate income, we assume a price of $2.25 per
bushel of corn and a drying cost of $0.04 per percentage point moisture above 15% (based on price data from the United
States Department of Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service, available at www.nass.usda.gov). Direct
comparisons are read directly from the full text of patent documents; indirect comparisons are measured by linking the
new hybrid through at least one other hybrid with a third hybrid that is not listed on the patent for the new hybrid.
yields 181.1 bushels per acre. In comparison, Pioneer’s existing hybrid 3394
yields 172 bushels per acre (Figure 2.2, left patent). This implies an increase in
yields of 5.29 percent.
The data include a total of 726 self-reported comparisons; the average new
hybrid is compared with 2.8 existing hybrids in self-reported comparisons (Ta-
ble 2.2). As a first step, we measure the magnitude of inventions by comparing
the new hybrid with the highest-yielding existing hybrid that is listed as a com-
parison plant.
To test whether breeders strategically report comparison plants that maxi-
mize the magnitude of the invention that they report to the USPTO we construct
an additional set of indirect comparisons that were not reported to the USPTO
but can be established by linking the new hybrid through another hybrid with
a comparison hybrid that was not reported to the USPTO. For example, Pio-
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neer’s hybrid 3491 (USPTO 5,731,496 granted March 13, 1996, Figure 2.2, right
patent) yields 165.2 bushels per acre and is compared to Pioneer’s hybrid 3394,
which yields 164.7 bushels per acre, implying an 0.3 percent increase in yields
in self-reported comparisons. Pioneer’s hybrid 3375 is also compared to hybrid
3394 (USPTO 5,491,295 granted November 22, 1994, Figure 2.2, left patent), and
we use this link to establish an indirect comparison between hybrid 3491 and
3375, which implies that 3491 produces 4.74 less corn than the existing hybrid
3375.29 We are able to establish a total of 835 indirect comparisons for the 256
new hybrids in our data; on average a new hybrid can be linked with 3.3 exist-
ing hybrids in indirect comparisons.
Although breeders may choose the most favorable trial, there is no reason
to believe that they would systematically misreport the results of a given trial.
The close correspondence in time trends between U.S. average corn yields and
reported field trial data (Figure 2.3) also indicate that changes in field trial yields
are a good measure of increases in performance.
U.S. averages vary around 120 bushels per acre, while yields in the field trial
data remain around 140 bushels per acre, or 15-20 percent higher (Figure 2.3).
More generally, changes in yields over time are similar for the matched field trial
data and U.S. averages. Yields in field trials fluctuate less across years (with
a variance of 144 in field trials, compared with 201 in U.S. averages) because
growing conditions are more controlled in the field trials, but changes over time
in field trials reported on the patent applications closely mirror changes in U.S.
averages.
29The relative yield of hybrid 3491 to hybrid 3394 times the relative yield of hybrid 3394 to
hybrid 3375 equals (165.2/164.7)*(172.0/181.1) = 0.9526, implying a 4.74 percent decrease in
yield.
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Figure 2.3: Yields listed on Patent compared with U.S. Averages
Notes: Average yields per year of application for 256 patents granted for new hybrids in subclass 800/320.1 Maize
(available at www.uspto.gov). Yields are normalized to 15.5 percent moisture at harvest. Data on yields were collected
by a manual search of the full text of patent documents. Data on U.S. averages from the United States Department of
Agriculture (www.nass.usda.gov).
New plants are also customarily tested by independent experiment stations.
We use data from the annual reports of the Kentucky Hybrid Corn Performance
Tests between 1996 and 2009 to verify yields that breeders report on patent doc-
uments. Hybrids for 17 direct comparisons were also tested in Kentucky (Figure
B.2).30
Correlation coefficients between yields on USPTO patents and in Kentucky
field trials are 0.44 for yields and 0.38 for income, indicating a significant posi-
tive, but imperfect relationship (Figure B.3, B.4). Differences may be due to the
fact that field trials are conducted in different locations and under different cli-
matic conditions, so that two field trials for the same plant may not yield the
same results. This is less problematic for the self-reported comparisons, which
30Experiments are run by the University of Kentucky (www.ca.uky.edu/cornvarietytest/).
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compare two plants in the same trial, but creates measurement error for the in-
direct comparisons, which compare plants across trials.
2.4 Measures of patent quality
2.4.1 Counts of citations by later patents
To measure citation counts for the 256 hybrids in our sample, we search U.S.
patents between January 1, 1986 and December 31, 2010 for references to the
patent number of the 256 hybrids. This allows us to observe a minimum of 5
years of citations history for each patent.
The average patent for hybrid corn receives 7.55 citations between 1985 and
2010 (Table 2.1, Figure 2.4). In comparison, the average patent in NBER patent
data (Hall et al., 2001) receives 3.0 citations within the first 5 years after the
patent grant, 5.3 citations within 10 years, and 7.3 citations within 25 years.31
Five foundational patents are cited more than 100 times each
Two patents, for which DeKalb applied in 1985, are cited 136 and 137 times,
respectively. DeKalb’s patent USPTO 4,607,453 (filed on February 21, 1985, and
granted on August 26, 1986) covers novel F1 hybrid corn plant dk672, novel
seeds of the hybrid, seeds produced by cultivation of the hybrid, cells which
upon growth and differentiation produce the novel hybrid and a method to
31Citations until 2006 are drawn from http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/patents.html.
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Figure 2.4: Citations per Patent, excluding Outliers
Notes: Data on 251 patents granted for new hybrids in subclass 800/320.1 Maize between January 1, 1985 and March 8,
2005 (available at www.uspto.gov). Excluding five patents that received 136, 137, 139, 212 and 551 citations respectively.
Data on citations were collected by an automatic search utilizing data available at www.uspto.gov.
produce the novel hybrid. DeKalb’s patent 4,629,819 (filed on April 26, 1985,
and granted on December 16, 1986) covers novel F1 hybrid corn plants dk524,
seeds produced by cultivation of the hybrid, and plant cells which upon growth
and differentiation produce the novel hybrid.
Both of these patents are very likely cited so many times because they were
the first patents after re Hibberd that were granted by the USPTO, and they
are cited independently of their yields and other characteristics. In fact, most
DeKalb patents cite Hibberd’s patent along with the early patents that were is-
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sued to DeKalb to establish the patentability of their inventions. After 1985,
DeKalb did not apply for any additional patents for hybrid corn until 1990,
when it applied for one patent (Figure 2.6, USPTO 5,589,605, granted on De-
cember 31, 1996 for hybrid EXP 748). Similarly, two patents for which Pioneer
applied for in 1987, seven years before the company begins to patent systemati-
cally, receive a large number of citations. Pioneer’s first patent USPTO 4,731,499
(for Pioneer hybrid 3790, granted on March 15, 1988) is the most cited patent in
our data, with a total of 551 citations:
Patent number: 4,731,499
Title: Hybrid corn plant and seed
Date issued: March 15, 1988
Date filed: January 29, 1987
Inventors: Carrigan; Lori (New London, MN);
Puskaric; Vladimir (Woodstock, CA)
Assignee: Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. (Johnston, IA)
Abstract: According to the invention, there is provided a hybrid
corn plant, designated 3790, produced by crossing two
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. proprietary inbred
lines of corn. This invention thus relates to the hybrid
seed 3790, the hybrid plant produced from the seed,
variants, mutants, and modifications of Pioneer hybrid
3790. This hybrid corn plant is characterized by superior
yields and excellent early-season cold tolerance,
and good grain quality.
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Claims: What is claimed is: 1. Hybrid corn seed designated 3790.
2. A hybrid corn plant and its plant parts produced by
the seed of claim 1. 3. Corn plants and the seed thereof
regenerated from tissue culture of the hybrid corn plant
and plant parts of claim 2. 4. A hybrid corn plant with
the phenotypic characteristics of the hybrid plant of
claim 2.
In a section entitled “background,” this patent application includes a de-
scription of the process of breeding hybrid corn; nearly all patents for corn hy-
brids that follow it include a similar description. Pioneer’s second patent in
1987, USPTO 4,737,596 (for Pioneer hybrid 3471, produced by crossing two pro-
prietary Pioneer inbred corn lines, granted on January 29, 1987), is cited by 139
later patents. This patent, as well as nearly all other patents, includes the same
description of the corn breeding process as Pioneer’s foundational patent for
hybrid 3470. USPTO patent 6,433,261, for the inbred corn plant 89AHD12 and
“hybrid genetic complements of the inbred corn plant 89AHD12”, received 212
citations.
2.4.2 Claims as a measure for the scope of patents
Claims, which define the scope of protection by specifying the matter that is sub-
ject to the utility patent, have been proposed as another measure for the qual-
ity of innovations (e.g. Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). While other types
of intellectual property rights cover only one claim (plant patents for asexu-
ally reproduced plants under the PP Act of 1930) or no claims (under the PVP
Act of 1970), utility patents can include a large number of claims. Each utility
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Table 2.3: Renewal Decisions
Notes: Data include renewals up to 2010. This leads to truncation: Renewals after 12 years are observable only for
patents granted up to 1998. Renewals after 8 years are observable only for patents granted up to 2002. Patent and
renewal fee data from the USPTO.
patent includes at least one claim, which typically covers the seed of the plant,
as well as plants with the phenotypic characteristics of plant grown from that
seed.32 Additional claims cover plant traits, such as heat tolerance and disease
resistance, breeding methods, or characteristics as a food product. We include
claims as a measure for the scope of patents in regressions of citations counts on
improvements in yields and other characteristics of hybrid corn.
2.4.3 Renewal decisions
As mentioned above, patent renewal decisions have been suggested as an alter-
native measure for the quality of patented inventions. Nearly all patents in our
data were renewed to full term (Table 2.3).33 The USPTO introduced renewal
fees to keep patents active on December 11, 1980. Renewal fees are $980 to keep
32Breeders deposit specimen of these seeds with the American Type Culture Collection
(ATCC) “an independent, private, nonprofit biological resource center (BRC) and research or-
ganization whose mission focuses on the acquisition, authentication, production, preservation,
development and distribution of standard reference microorganisms, cell lines and other ma-
terials for research in the life sciences.” http://www.atcc.org/About/tabid/138/Default.aspx
(assessed on 12/02/2011).
33Data on renewal fees and renewal decisions from www.uspto.gov.
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a patent active at 4 years after the grant, $2,480 at 8 years, and $4,110 at 11 years.
Among 256 patents of hybrid corn in our data, only 71 patents were at least 12
years old in 2011 and could have been renewed for the full term; 66 of these
patents (93 percent), were renewed to full term. A total of 224 patents were at
least 8 years old in 2011; 218 of these patents (97 percent) were renewed after 8
years; 251 patents (98 percent) were renewed after 4 years (Table 2.3).
Thus, nearly all patents were renewed to full term, with the exception of
three early DeKalb patents (including one of the company’s heavily cited foun-
dational patents) and two patents by Kleinwanzlebener Saatzucht AG, a small
German breeder. Three of the five patents that were never renewed are patents
that the USPTO granted to DeKalb in 1995 (before DeKalb had been acquired by
Monsanto on May 11, 1998): USPTO 5,436,389 granted on July 25, 1995, USPTO
5,444,177 granted on August 22, 1995, and USPTO 5,451,705 granted on Septem-
ber 19, 1995. DeKalb’s foundational patent USPTO 4,629,819 (granted on De-
cember 16, 1986) received 137 citations, and was renewed at 4 and 8, but not
12 years. Only two additional patents, for dent corn hybrids, assigned to the
German Kleinwanzlebener Saatzucht AG were not renewed for the full term:
USPTO 5,929,312 granted on July 27, 1999 and USPTO 6,127,608 granted on Oc-
tober 3, 2000.
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Improvements over the prior art
Of 256 patented corn hybrids, only 107 (or 42 percent) produced more corn than
existing hybrids (Table 2.2). The largest improvement in yields is 10 percent,
but the data also include a hybrid that produces 25 percent less than existing
hybrids (Figure 2.5). Data on improvements in income per acre confirm the
relatively small magnitude of inventive output. Only 113 of 256 new hybrids
(or 44 percent) produce more income than existing hybrids (Table 2.2).
These findings are robust across examiners and assignees. A total of nine
primary patent examiners granted the 256 patents in our sample; two examiners
granted 189 and 34 patents, respectively (Table 2.4). Estimates for the size of
improvements are roughly comparable across examiners.
Patents are assigned to eight different breeders. The top two breeders, Pio-
neer and DeKalb, produced 129 and 110 respectively (Table 2.5). For Pioneer,
the estimates for the average magnitude of inventive output are negative, with
-2.4 percent for yields and -2.2 percent for income. In comparison, estimates
for DeKalb/Monsanto are close to zero and slightly positive for yields, at 0.3
percent, and slightly negative for income at -0.1 percent. For both firms, the
magnitude of improvements declines over time (Figure 2.6).
The data also reveal a decline in the magnitude of inventions over time. The
gradual nature of this decline is consistent with the idea that yields approach a
natural upper limit. For example, there is no evidence of a trend break in the
years of Monsanto’s aggressive acquisition policies (1994-1996) even though the
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Figure 2.5: Improvements in Yields listed on new Patents by Year of Ap-
plication
Notes: Improvements in yields are calculated by comparing the yield of the new hybrid with the highest-yielding (top
figure) or average-yielding hybrid (bottom figure) with similar characteristics. Calculations include both direct and
indirect comparisons. Direct comparisons are read directly from the full text of patent documents; indirect comparisons
are measured by linking the new hybrid through at least one other hybrid with a third hybrid that is not listed on the
patent for the new hybrid. Data on all 256 patents in subclass 800/320.1 Maize granted between January 1, 1985 and
March 8, 2005 (available at www.uspto.gov).
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Figure 2.6: Improvements in Yields - Pioneer and DeKalb
Notes: Improvements in yields are calculated by comparing the yield of the new hybrid with the highest-yielding hybrid
with similar characteristics. Calculations include both direct and indirect comparisons. Direct comparisons are read
directly from the full text of patent documents; indirect comparisons are measured by linking the new hybrid through
at least one other hybrid with a third hybrid that is not listed on the patent for the new hybrid. Data on all 129 patents
in subclass 800/320.1 Maize granted between January 1, 1985 and March 8, 2005 assigned to Pioneer and all 110 patents
assigned to DeKalb Genetics (available at www.uspto.gov).
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Table 2.4: Improvements in Yield and Income per Acre by Patent Examiner
Notes: An observation consists of a utility patent protecting a new hybrid. Data on yields were collected by a search
of patents in subclass 800/320.1 Maize (available at www.uspto.gov). Information on the primary patent examiner
was obtained through an automated search. On the patent document breeders compare their new hybrid to existing
hybrids to demonstrate that the new hybrid is a patentable improvement. To control for improvements in addition to
yields, measures of income per acre incorporate information on the moisture content of hybrids. To calculate income,
we assume a price of $2.25 per bushel of corn and a drying cost of $0.04 per percentage point moisture above 15% (based
on price data from the United States Department of Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service, available at
www.nass.usda.gov).
absolute number of patents increased dramatically during this period.
2.5.2 Strategic reporting
We find that breeders choose comparison plants that magnify the size of the
improvement over the prior art. Data for 172 indirect comparisons, which we
establish by linking new hybrids to other hybrids not reported on the patent,
suggest that only 35 percent of new hybrids produce more corn or income than
existing hybrids (Table 2.2). Although indirect comparisons are likely to be mea-
sured with some error, these results are suggestive. Comparisons of the distri-
bution of self-reported and indirect comparisons confirm that breeders consis-
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Table 2.5: Improvements in Yield and Income per Acre by Assignee
Notes: 1) Monsanto acquired Asgrow in 1997 and DeKalb Genetics in 1998. An observation consists of a utility patent
protecting a new hybrid. Data on yields were collected by a search of patents in subclass 800/320.1 Maize (available
at www.uspto.gov). Information on the assignee was obtained through an automated search. On the patent document
breeders compare their new hybrid to existing hybrids to demonstrate that the new hybrid is a patentable improvement.
To control for improvements in addition to yields, measures of income per acre incorporate information on the moisture
content of hybrids. To calculate income, we assume a price of $2.25 per bushel of corn and a drying cost of $0.04 per
percentage point moisture above 15% (based on price data from the United States Department of Agriculture’s National
Agricultural Statistics Service, available at www.nass.usda.gov).
tently choose comparison plants that increase the magnitude of their improve-
ment over existing hybrids (Figure 2.7).
There is no evidence of statistically significant differences over time between
self-reported and indirect comparisons; both series exhibit a decline over time
from about 6 percent in 1989 to -4 percent in 2000 (Figures A5 and A6).
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Figure 2.7: Increase in Yield per Acre
Notes: Data on 256 patents granted for new hybrids in subclass 800/320.1 Maize between January 1, 1985 and March 8,
2005 (available at www.uspto.gov). Improvements in yields are calculated by comparing the yield of the new hybrid
with the highest-yielding hybrid with similar characteristics. Calculations include both direct and indirect comparisons.
Direct comparisons are read directly from the full text of patent documents; indirect comparisons are measured by
linking the new hybrid through at least one other hybrid with a third hybrid that is not listed on the patent for the new
hybrid. Excluding five patents that received 136, 137, 139, 212 and 551 citations respectively.
2.5.3 Claims
Data on claims indicate that the number of claims varies across firms, and in-
creases over time. Across all years and breeders, the average patent includes
24.22 claims (Table 2.1). Over time, the mean number of claims per patent in-
creases from 6.71 in 1985 to 30.86 in 2002 (Figure 2.8). Breeders appear to de-
velop templates for their claims and expand their templates to add new claims
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Figure 2.8: Number of Claims by Year of Application
Notes: Bubble size represents the number of observations ranging from 1 to 25. For example: there are 25 patents each
having 31 claims in 1999. Data on all 256 patents granted for new hybrids in subclass 800/320.1 Maize granted between
January 1, 1985 and March 8, 2005 (available at www.uspto.gov). Data on claims were collected by a manual search of
the full text of patent documents.
over time. The average patent of DeKalb includes 32.27 claims; which cover
the inbred parents of the hybrid, along with the hybrid itself, which is the main
subject matter of the patent (Figure 2.9). In comparison, the average patent of
Pioneer covers roughly half the number of claims, at 16.58 claims per patent,
which typically only cover the hybrid itself, and not its inbred parents. 102 of
DeKalb’s 110 patents cover inbred parents, in addition to the hybrid seed.
Claims are only weakly correlated with the number of hybrids covered by
the same patent (Figure 2.10). A total of 19 in 256 patents (7.42 percent) pro-
tect more than one hybrid; the average patent protects 1.25 hybrids. Across all
hybrids, the correlation between claims and the number of hybrids that are pro-
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Figure 2.9: Number of Claims by Year of Application - Pioneer and Dekalb
Notes: Bubble size represents the number of observations ranging from 1 to 25. For example: there are 25 patents by Pio-
neer each having 31 claims in 1999. Data on all 129 patents in subclass 800/320.1 Maize granted between January 1, 1985
and March 8, 2005 assigned to Pioneer and all 110 patents assigned to Dekalb Genetics (available at www.uspto.gov).
Data on claims were collected by a manual search of the full text of patent documents.
74
Figure 2.10: Number of Hybrids covered versus Number of Claims
Notes: Data on all 256 patents in subclass 800/320.1 Maize granted between January 1, 1985 and March 8, 2005 (available
at www.uspto.gov). Data on claims were collected by a manual search of the full text of patent documents.
tected by a patent is 0.1111. Eighteen of the 19 patents that protect multiple
hybrids are assigned to DeKalb; the remaining patent is assigned to the French
seed company Euralis.
The data also indicate that claims are positively correlated with the number
of patents that cover the same hybrid (Figure 2.11). Forty of 256 patented corn
hybrids (16 percent) are covered by two or more patents; the average hybrid
is covered by 1.20 patents, 28 hybrids are covered by 2 patents, 12 hybrids are
covered by 3 patents. Across all hybrids, the correlation between claims and the
number of patents that cover the same hybrid is 0.3155. Thirty-five of the 40
patents are assigned to DeKalb, 3 patents to Rustica Prograin Genetique and 2
to Pioneer. The correlation between claims and the number of DeKalb patents
that cover the same hybrid is 0.0922.
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Figure 2.11: Number of Patents that cover the same Hybrids versus Num-
ber of Claims
Notes: Data on all 256 patents in subclass 800/320.1 Maize granted between January 1, 1985 and March 8, 2005 (available
at www.uspto.gov). Data on claims were collected by a manual search of the full text of patent documents.
Overall, the data suggest that claims and the structure of patents (number of
patents covering the same hybrid and number of hybrids covered by the same
patent) are specific to breeders, who follow their own, firm-specific templates
of patent applications, and may therefore contain only limited information re-
garding the scope of patents, at least for hybrid corn.
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2.5.4 Relationship between citations and the magnitude of in-
ventive output
OLS and negative binomial regressions estimate the correlation between cita-
tions and the size of improvements in yields and other characteristics, using
claims to control for the scope of patents and allowing for year and firm fixed
effects:
Citationi = α + β1Increase in yieldsi + β2Claimsi
+γZi + δi + β3DeKalbi + β4Other firmi + i
where Citations counts the number of later patents that cite one of the 256
patents for corn hybrids, Increase in yields measures the percent increase in yields
that the newly patented hybrid offers over existing hybrids, and Claims counts
the number of claims that define the scope of the patent. The variable δ indicates
year fixed effects, DeKalb distinguishes patents assigned to DeKalb, and Other
firms denotes patents that are neither assigned to DeKalb or Pioneer, which is
the excluded category. 129 out of the 256 patents (30 percent) in our data are
assigned to Pioneer.
Comparisons between citations counts and increases in yields indicate a
strong positive correlation (Figure 2.12). OLS and negative binomial regressions
with additional controls for the number of claims of a patent, the number of hy-
brids covered by the patent, the number of other patents covering a hybrid, year
of application, firm and/or year fixed effects, confirm these results (Table 2.6).34
34We estimate negative binomial regressions instead of Poisson to account for over-dispersion
in the dependent variable. If two regressors in a count data model are collinear for the sub-
sample of positive observations of the dependent variable, maximum-likelihood estimates may
yield spurious estimates (Santos-Silva and Tenreyro 2009). We checked whether any pair of
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Figure 2.12: Increase in Yield per Acre versus Number of Citations, ex-
cluding Outliers
Notes: Data on 256 patents granted for new hybrids in subclass 800/320.1 Maize between January 1, 1985 and March 8,
2005 (available at www.uspto.gov). Improvements in yields are calculated by comparing the yield of the new hybrid
with the highest-yielding hybrid with similar characteristics. Calculations include both direct and indirect comparisons.
Direct comparisons are read directly from the full text of patent documents; indirect comparisons are measured by
linking the new hybrid through at least one other hybrid with a third hybrid that is not listed on the patent for the new
hybrid. Excluding five patents that received 136, 137, 139, 212 and 551 citations respectively. Data on citations were
collected by an automatic search utilizing data available at www.uspto.gov.
In negative binomial regressions on a restricted sample (excluding the five
outlier patents that receive over 100 each) with firm- and year-fixed effects, a 10
percentage point increase in yields is associated with a 1.9 additional citations
(Table 2.7, column 1, significant at the 1 percent level), and a 10 percentage point
regressors in the subsample of observations with a strictly positive number of citations are
collinear, and found no evidence of collinearity. Out of 110 patents assigned to DeKalb, 102
patents also cover the hybrid’s parent inbred in addition to the new hybrid. In addition to the
reported regressions, we run the specification reported in column (3) and (4) with an additional
dummy variable controlling for whether or not a parent inbred is also covered. Neither the
coefficients on the percentage increase in yield (up to 3 digits of precision) nor the significance
levels are changed due to the inclusion of the extra dummy variable.
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increase in income is associated with 2.5 additional citations (Table 2.9, column
1, significant at the 1 percent level) when the comparison is made with respect
to the highest-yielding comparison hybrid. A 10 percentage point increase in
yields is associated with 2.4 additional citations when the comparison is made
with respect to the average comparison hybrid (Table 2.8, column 1, significant
at the 1 percent level). These results are robust to alternative specifications as
OLS (Tables 2.7 to 2.9, column 5, significant at the 1 percent level), as well as the
inclusion of linear and quadratic time trends (Tables 2.7 to 2.9, columns 2 and
6, significant at the 1 percent level). Considering direct (i.e. self-reported) and
indirect comparisons separately, the coefficient on percentage increases in yield or
income is consistently positive and significant (Table 2.10).
Coefficient estimates for the number of claims are not significant at the 10
percent level in any specification (Table 2.6 to 2.10). In addition to the number
of claims, which is a measure of the scope of a patent, we also use the number of
hybrids covered by the patent as well as the number of other hybrids covering
the patented hybrid as alternative measures for the scope of a patent. Both
variables are not significant the 10 percent level (Table 2.6 to 2.9, columns (3)
and (7)). Since Pioneer patents do not show any variation in the number of
hybrids covered (always equal to 1) or the number of other patents covering the
same hybrid (always equal to zero), we ran the same regressions for a subset
of our data set, including only patents assigned to DeKalb. The coefficient on
the percentage increase in yield or income remains positive and significant, but
becomes larger (Table 2.7 to 2.9, columns (4) and (8)).
Estimates in the data set including the outlier patents are substantially larger,
implying between 4 and 6 additional citations (Table 2.6, Full sample).
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Other characteristics: Suitability to different climates
The most important limitation of our tests is that, although we use data on yields
as the bottom line measure of most characteristics and include moisture as an
additional control, we cannot control for all characteristics of hybrid corn. Most
of these characteristics, such as resistance to herbicides or pests, affect the qual-
ity of hybrid corn through improvements in yields, but one important adaptive
characteristics – variation in the suitability to different climates – cannot be cap-
tured by measuring yields.35 New hybrids may have been developed to take
advantage of climatic conditions in different locations of North America; re-
gions with colder climates and shorter summers require hybrids with earlier
relative maturity rates (i.e., fewer days required to grow.)
To examine whether such variation might explain relatively low rates of im-
provement measured by raw patent counts, or perhaps even the strong positive
correlation between yields and citations, we collect data on variation in relative
levels of maturity for Pioneer hybrids, whose names include encoded informa-
tion on relative maturity. Specifically, the second digit in the product names
of new Pioneer hybrids between 1997 and 2005 identifies the relative maturity
level on a scale from 0 (very full) to 9 (very short).36 For example, the digit 9
preceding the “r” in the name of Pioneer’s new hybrid 39r34 (USPTO 6,797,868;
granted on September 28, 2004) indicates that this hybrid has a very short rela-
tive maturity. 89 of 215 total hybrids between 1997 and 2005 are Pioneer hybrids
35Variation in the sugar content of hybrids is another important characteristic that is not cap-
tured by variation in yields; to avoid this problem, we focus on a) field corn rather than sweet
corn and b) on patent grants that precede the Energy Act of 2005, which increased the relative
price of ethanol and motivated breeders of field corn to shift towards improving hybrids to
produce more sugar (and thereby ethanol).
36See www.pioneer.com/home/site/ca/products/product-naming-system for a key to Pio-
neer’s naming practices.
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Figure 2.13: Relative Maturity of new Pioneer Hybrids versus Number of
Citations
Notes: Starting in 1997, Pioneer reveals the relative maturity of newly patented hybrids through the prod-
uct code that they assign to their new hybrids (details on the assignment of product name available at
www.pioneer.com/home/site/ca/products/product-naming-system). The second digit reveals the relative maturity
level with a larger number implying a shorter relative maturity. Data on all 89 patents with information on the relative
maturity index in subclass 800/320.1 Maize granted between January 1, 1985 and March 8, 2005 assigned to Pioneer
(available at www.uspto.gov).
and we are able to measure relative maturity for 89 hybrids of these hybrids.
Data on variation in the relative maturity of Pioneer hybrids yield no evi-
dence of systematic changes in the number of citations (Figure 2.13). The corre-
lation coefficient between the relative maturity level and the number of citations
is 0.0011.37
37Including fixed effects to control for variation in relative maturity reduces the sample to
79 patents by Pioneer. In this subsample the p-value for the coefficient estimate of the average
marginal effect of the percentage increase in yield per acre is 0.158 without maturity fixed effects
and 0.197 with maturity fixed effects.
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2.6 Conclusions
Our analysis of 256 utility patents for hybrid corn granted between 1986 and
2005 suggests that more than half of all newly patented hybrids do not produce
more corn or income than existing hybrids. The data also indicate that improve-
ments in yields per acre and in income are declining over time, possibly due to
decreasing returns to invention.
Importantly, however, we establish a strong and robust positive relationship
between the magnitude of inventions and the number of citations received from
subsequently granted U.S. patents, suggesting that citations-adjusted patent
counts are a useful measure for the magnitude of inventions.
Our analysis points out some of the shortcomings of alternative measures
of patent quality. Breeders appear to develop templates for their claims and ex-
pand their templates to add new claims over time. Further, we find that renewal
decisions for the patents in our data are independent the size of the improve-
ments of the covered hybrids.
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CHAPTER 3
ON THE OPTIMALITY OF AWARDING PATENTS AND PRIZES AS
INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION
3.1 Introduction
There are various mechanisms intended to provide incentives for innovation.
Two possible policy instruments are patents and prizes. The patent system
grants exclusive rights to innovators for some period of time and prevents com-
petitors from copying the innovation during the time period that the patent is
in force. The benefit of granting monopoly rights, which induce innovation by
allowing inventors to recoup the costs of an innovation, comes at the cost of
the usual deadweight social loss due to the monopoly in the product market.
There exists an extensive literature on the design of the patent system. Nord-
haus (1969) is the seminal work with respect to the length of patent protection.
Klemperer (1990), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Gallini (1992) analyze the op-
timal design of patent protection if it is possible to choose both patent length as
well as patent breadth. The case of sequential innovations was first considered
by Scotchmer (1991), Green and Scotchmer (1995) and O’Donoghue et al. (1998).
Scotchmer (1999) introduces the idea that the current patent renewal system
can be analyzed in a principal-agent model in which the patent office (princi-
pal) does not observe the type of the inventor (size of the invention) and offers
a menu of patent length and associated fees. Analyzing the optimality of such
a menu of patent length and associated fees, she finds that such a renewal sys-
tem is only optimal under restrictive assumptions about the join distribution of
patent value and R&D cost.
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An alternative to patents are prizes. Prizes reward innovators while mak-
ing the innovation available to the public immediately and therefore avoid the
deadweight social loss of patents. However, in order to award optimal prizes,
information about the social value of an innovation is required. Kremer (1998)
and Chari et al. (2011) provide examples of how information available from
other firms in the market can be used to learn about the social value of an inno-
vation.
In this chapter, I derive optimal mechanisms of awarding patents and prizes
under three different information environments. Using the full information en-
vironment as the benchmark, I analyze the case in which information about the
value of an innovation is (i) only observed by the innovating firm or (ii) by the
innovating firm and other firms in the same industry.
In general, the social planner awards prizes whenever these are available as a
policy instrument. While there exist mechanisms to reveal the social value of an
innovation under the private information environment, truth telling can only be
achieved by providing some patent protection in most of the considered cases.
The social surplus is then lower than the full information benchmark. When the
social planner can use market information from competitors about the social
value of an innovation, it is possible to achieve the same level of social surplus
as in the full information benchmark.
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3.2 Setup of the model
The basic setup follows what Scotchmer (2004) terms the “ideas model.”1 A firm
(also referred to as the inventor) receives an idea. An idea is fully described by
its value (or size) v > 0 and cost c > 0, jointly referred to as the inventor’s type
θ = (c, v), which is an element of the type space Θ. I assume that there are only
two possible types
θ ∈ Θ =
{
θ1, θ2
}
=
{(
c1, v1
)
,
(
c2, v2
)}
.
Without loss of generality, let v2 > v1. Let p (v1) denote the probability that the
idea is of type θ1 and 1− p (v1) denote the probability that the idea is of type θ2.
In order to turn an idea into an innovation, the firm must incur the one time cost
c. A larger cost is associated with a larger value, so c2 > c1 ⇔ v2 > v1. Let pi (v)
denote the per-period change in the inventor’s profit that a patent would earn
from an innovation of value v. I assume that pi (·) > 0 for all v and v2 > v1 ⇔
pi (v2) > pi (v1). Associated with each innovation is a change in social surplus.
Let Sp (v) denote the per-period change in social surplus from an innovation of
value v while the patent is in force and S (v) denote the per-period change in
social surplus while the patent is (no longer) in force.
Due to product market distortion, the per-period change in social surplus is
smaller while a patent is in force. The per-period change in social surplus while
the patent is in force consists of the producer and consumer surplus. Combining
these two arguments gives S (v) > Sp (v) > pi (v) for an innovation of value v. I
will assume that each innovation is socially desirable (S(v)
r
≥ c ∀ (c, v) = θ ∈ Θ,
where r denotes the interest rate used for discounting) and furthermore that
1Applications of the ideas model can be found for example in Green and Scotchmer (1995),
O’Donoghue et al. (1998), Scotchmer (1999), Scotchmer (2004) and Chari et al. (2011).
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(possibly infinite) patent protection would be sufficient to cover the cost of each
innovation (pi(v)
r
≥ c ∀ (c, v) = θ ∈ Θ).
Assume that the social planner has two instruments to reward innovations at
her disposal: patents and prizes. Patents represent an exclusive right to use the
idea and are awarded for a certain duration of time. Let the discounted patent
length be denoted by t , namely
t =
t¯ˆ
0
e−rτdτ =
1
r
(
1− e−rt¯
)
where t¯ denotes undiscounted length of time. The option to award patents
includes the possibility to offer a menu of patent lengths and associated fees,
which is equivalent to a system of patent renewal. Therefore t might depend on
v and I denote the (discounted) patent length as t (v). Let x (v) denote the fee
associated with a patent of (discounted) length t (v).
The second instrument available to the social planner are prizes (denoted by
P (v)), which are lump sum transfers financed by lump sum taxes on consumers.
However, I impose an upper bound equal to the maximum discounted change
in social surplus associated with an innovation, that is P (v) ≤ S(v)
r
. For the
case that both a patent and a prize are awarded simultaneously, I impose the
restriction that pi (v) t (v)− x (v) + P (v) ≤ S(v)
r
.
Notice that a patent on its own can never ’over-reward’ an innovation. The
longest possible patent protection is a patent of infinite (undiscounted) duration
or equivalently t = 1
r
. From pi (v) < S (v), it follows that pi(v)
r
< S(v)
r
.
The objective of the social planner is to maximize social surplus. The objec-
tive function is given by
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p
(
v1
) [
Sp
(
v1
)
t
(
v1
)
+ S
(
v1
)(1
r
− t
(
v1
))]
+
(
1− p
(
v1
)) [
Sp
(
v2
)
t
(
v2
)
+ S
(
v2
)(1
r
− t
(
v2
))]
.
In the objective function, the change in social surplus is equal to Sp (v) while
the patent is in force during the time period between 0 and t¯ (v) (or equivalently
in discounted time: t (v)). From t¯ (v) onwards, the patent is no longer in force
and the the change in social surplus is equal to S (v). Transfers to or from the
innovator are lump sum transfers and therefore not costly or beneficial from a
social point of view.
3.3 Full information
The cost and value of the idea are fully observed by the innovator and the social
planner.
3.3.1 Patents
Suppose that only patents are available as a policy instrument.2 In this case it is
optimal to award patents of length t (v1) = t1 = c
1
pi(v1)
and t (v2) = t2 = c
2
pi(v2)
. Both
types of patents will be granted without charging a fee, so x (v1) = x (v2) = 0.
An innovator of type θ1 (or θ2, respectively) will not invest in the idea if the
patent length is shorter than t1 (or t2, respectively), since she would not be able
to cover the cost c1 (or c2, respectively). Since both types of innovations are
2A similar analysis of the full information case when only patents are available as a reward
can be found in chapter 4 of Scotchmer (2004).
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assumed to be socially beneficial (S(v)
r
≥ c), a patent length shorter than t1 (or
t2, respectively) cannot be socially optimal. Since Sp (v) < S (v), any patent
length longer than t1 (or t2, respectively) would decrease social surplus. While
it would be possible to ’tax’ any profit above what is necessary to cover the
cost of the innovation through charging fees (turning producer into consumer
surplus), some social surplus would be lost (to be precise: S (v)−SP (v) for every
increase in t (v)). Therefore, a patent length longer than t1 (or t2, respectively)
cannot be socially optimal.
3.3.2 Patents and prizes
Suppose now that prizes are available in addition to patents. In this case, it is
optimal to use prizes exclusively. Since both types of innovations are assumed
to be socially beneficial (S(v)
r
≥ c), the planner should provide enough incentives
to the innovator of both types to invest in the idea. Since prizes do not affect the
social surplus, setting them to c1 ≤ P (v1) ≤ S(v
1)
r
and c2 ≤ P (v2) ≤ S(v
2)
r
allows the inventor to recover the cost and maximizes social surplus.3 Since
Sp (v) < S (v), any positive patent length would decrease social surplus.
3.4 Private information
This section considers the case that the cost and value of the idea are only ob-
served by the innovator. The social planner does not observe the innovator’s
type , but has knowledge about the probability distribution over the type space.
3Notice that a prize of P (v) = c would maximize consumer surplus and a prize of P (v) =
S(v)
r would maximize producer surplus.
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3.4.1 Patents
Suppose that only patents are available as a policy instrument.4 There are three
different possible relationships between the cost and per-period change in profit
associated with an innovation:
1. If c
1
pi(v1)
= c
2
pi(v2)
, the social planner should award patents of discounted
length t1 = c
1
pi(v1)
= c
2
pi(v2)
= t2 and charge no fees. An innovator of type θ1
(or θ2, respectively) will not invest in the idea if the patent length is shorter
than t1 (or t2, respectively), since she would not be able to cover the cost c1
(or c2, respectively). Since both types of innovations are assumed to be so-
cially beneficial, a patent length shorter than t1 (or t2, respectively) cannot
be socially optimal. Any patent length longer than t1 (or t2, respectively)
would decrease social surplus. Charging fees would require an increase
in patent length to prevent the innovator from dropping the innovation.
The increase in patent length would decrease social surplus, while the fees
would not increase social surplus. Therefore, the social planner should not
charge any fees. The outcome in terms of social surplus is identical to the
full information case above.
2. If c
1
pi(v1)
< c
2
pi(v2)
, the social planner can implement a menu of patent lengths
and associated fees . The intuition behind the menu of patent lengths and
associated fees is the following: the cost structure implies that the inno-
vator of type θ2 requires a longer patent protection to cover her cost than
the innovator of type θ1. Since patent protection should be kept as short
as possible (in the sense that it needs to be long enough to induce invest-
4A similar analysis of the private information case in which patents are available as a reward
can be found in Scotchmer (1999).
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ment into the idea) to maximize social welfare, the social planner can use
a direct revelation mechanism to learn about the type of the innovator and
award a patent with a duration depending on the reported type. Charg-
ing a higher fee for a longer patent makes it possible that the incentive
constraints hold. Notice that an increase in the patent duration is more
beneficial to the innovator of type θ2, since the increase in the per-period
profit is larger for the type θ2 (pi (v2) > pi (v1)). Therefore, the type θ2 is
willing to pay a higher fee for an increase in the duration of patent pro-
tection compared to an innovator of type θ1. Increasing the patent length
above the level that would be required to just cover the cost for the type θ2
and simultaneously increasing the associated fee such that the innovator
of type θ2 can just cover her cost, makes the longer patent less and less
attractive to the innovator of type θ1, up to the point where the type θ1
innovator prefers the shorter patent. However, the longest patent that can
be awarded is a patent of infinite length (in undiscounted time) or equiva-
lently of t = 1
r
(in discounted time). The setup of the model allows for the
case that a type θ2 idea requires an infinite patent length (in undiscounted
time). In addition to the situations in which the required minimum patent
length is at or close to the upper bound, the larger the difference between
the minimum patent lengths ( c
2
pi(v2)
− c1
pi(v1)
), the larger will be the required
increase in the patent length for the type θ2 innovator. Therefore, there
will be cases in which it is not possible to construct such a menu of patent
lengths and associated fees. In what follows, I will distinguish between
both scenarios and show in which cases it is actually optimal to imple-
ment the direct revelation mechanism.
(a) Assume that c
2−c1
pi(v2)−pi(v1) ≤ 1r . I will show below that the left-hand
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side of this condition is the patent length necessary to induce truth
telling. The right-hand side is the upper limit of patent protection
in discounted time (equivalent to infinite patent protection in undis-
counted time). If this condition fails, it is not possible to construct
such a menu of patent lengths and associated fees.
The participation constraints are given by
pi
(
v1
)
t
(
v1
)
− c1 − x
(
v1
)
≥ 0
and
pi
(
v2
)
t
(
v2
)
− c2 − x
(
v2
)
≥ 0.
The incentive constraints are given by
pi
(
v1
)
t
(
v1
)
− c1 − x
(
v1
)
≥ pi
(
v1
)
t
(
v2
)
− c1 − x
(
v2
)
and
pi
(
v2
)
t
(
v2
)
− c2 − x
(
v2
)
≥ pi
(
v2
)
t
(
v1
)
− c2 − x
(
v1
)
.
It is no longer possible to award patents of length t (v1) = c
1
pi(v1)
and
t (v2) = c
2
pi(v2)
with associated fees being equal to x (v1) = x (v2) = 0.
The inventor of type θ1 would claim to be of type θ2 in order to be
awarded the longer patent protection. In order to decide whether to
implement the direct revelation mechanism or not, the planner has to
evaluate the benefit of having a shorter patent length for the innova-
tor of type θ1 ( c
1
pi(v1)
versus c
2
pi(v2)
) with the cost of a longer patent length
for the innovator of type θ2 ( c
2−c1
pi(v2)−pi(v1) versus
c2
pi(v2)
), weighted by their
respective probabilities.
i. Assume that p (v1) [S (v1)− Sp (v1)]
[
c2
pi(v2)
− c1
pi(v1)
]
≥ (1− p (v1)) [S (v2)− Sp (v2)]
[
c2−c1
pi(v2)−pi(v1) − c
2
pi(v2)
]
. The social
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planner should offer a patent of length t (v1) = c
1
pi(v1)
at no charge
(so x (v1) = 0) and a patent of length t (v2) = c
2−c1
pi(v2)−pi(v1) for a fee
of x (v2) =
c2pi(v1)−c1pi(v2)
pi(v2)−pi(v1) .
To derive t (v2) and x (v2), we need to consider the participation
constraint of the innovator of type θ2 and the incentive constraint
of the innovator of type θ1. Solving the participation constraint
for x (v2) gives
x
(
v2
)
= pi
(
v2
)
t
(
v2
)
− c2.
Given t (v1) = c
1
pi(v1)
and x (v1) = 0, solving the incentive con-
straint of the innovator of type θ1 for x (v2) gives
x
(
v2
)
= pi
(
v1
)
t
(
v2
)
− c1.
Setting both equations equal gives the patent length
t
(
v2
)
=
c2 − c1
pi (v2)− pi (v1)
and the associated fee
x
(
v2
)
= pi
(
v1
) c2 − c1
pi (v2)− pi (v1) − c
1 =
c2pi (v1)− c1pi (v2)
pi (v2)− pi (v1) .
ii. Assume that p (v1) [S (v1)− Sp (v1)]
[
c2
pi(v2)
− c1
pi(v1)
]
< (1− p (v1)) [S (v2)− Sp (v2)]
[
c2−c1
pi(v2)−pi(v1) − c
2
pi(v2)
]
. Although it is
possible, it is not optimal to implement a menu of patent lengths
and associated fees. The social planner should offer a patent of
fixed length t = c
2
pi(v2)
. Notice that it will never be optimal to
just induce the innovation of type θ1 by offering a fixed patent
length of t (v1) = c
1
pi(v1)
only. Offering a menu of patent lengths
and associated fees would lead to an increase in social surplus
even if t (v2) = 1
r
, since
Sp(v2)
r
≥ c2
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(b) Assume that c
2−c1
pi(v2)−pi(v1) >
1
r
. It is no longer possible to induce truth
telling through implementing a menu of patent lengths and associ-
ated fees, since even a patent of discounted duration 1/r (or equiv-
alently of infinite undiscounted duration) would not be sufficient to
compensate the fee that the type θ2 innovator has to pay in order to
prevent the type θ1 innovator from pretending to be of type θ2. In this
case, the social planner should either offer a patent of fixed length
t = c
1
pi(v1)
and only the type θ1 innovator will invest into her idea or
offer a patent of fixed length t = c
2
pi(v2)
in which case both types of
innovators would invest. Which of these options is optimal depends
on the benefit that stems from having a shorter patent protection for
the type θ1 versus the cost of not realizing the innovation of type θ2
at all, weighted by their respective probabilities.
i. If p (v1) [S (v1)− Sp (v1)]
[
c2
pi(v2)
− c1
pi(v1)
]
≤ (1− p (v1))
[
Sp (v2) c
2
pi(v2)
+ S (v2)
(
1
r
− c2
pi(v2)
)]
, the social planner
should award a patent of length t = c
2
pi(v2)
to both types of innova-
tors. Both types of innovators will invest. The innovator of type
θ2 will be able to just cover her cost, while the innovator of type
θ1 will generate discounted profits strictly above c1, but below
S(v1)
r
.
ii. If p (v1) [S (v1)− Sp (v1)]
[
c2
pi(v2)
− c1
pi(v1)
]
> (1− p (v1))
[
Sp (v2) c
2
pi(v2)
+ S (v2)
(
1
r
− c2
pi(v2)
)]
, the planner
should offer a patent of length t = c
1
pi(v1)
. Only the innovator of
type θ1 will accept. The innovator of type θ2 will choose not to
invest into the idea. Awarding a patent of length t = c
2
pi(v2)
would
be socially wasteful, since the additional benefit of inducing an
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innovator of type θ2 to invest into her idea would not outweigh
the loss in social surplus due to the extended patent protection
for the type θ1 innovation. The optimal patent length cannot be
longer than t = c
1
pi(v1)
. An innovator of type θ1 would not in-
vest into her idea if a patent of length shorter than t = c
1
pi(v1)
is
awarded. Therefore awarding a patent of length t = c
1
pi(v1)
is opti-
mal.
3. If c
1
pi(v1)
> c
2
pi(v2)
, it is no longer possible to offer a menu of patent lengths
and associated fees to induce truth telling. To see why a menu of fees and
patent lengths is no longer feasible, consider the incentive constraints
pi
(
v1
)
t
(
v1
)
− c1 − x
(
v1
)
≥ pi
(
v1
)
t
(
θ2
)
− c1 − x
(
v2
)
or
pi
(
v1
) [
t
(
v1
)
− t
(
v2
)]
≥ x
(
v1
)
− x
(
v2
)
and
pi
(
v2
)
t
(
v2
)
− c2 − x
(
v2
)
≥ pi
(
v2
)
t
(
v1
)
− c2 − x
(
v1
)
or
pi
(
v2
) [
t
(
v1
)
− t
(
v2
)]
≤ x
(
v1
)
− x
(
v2
)
.
Combining them gives
pi
(
v2
) [
t
(
v1
)
− t
(
v2
)]
≤ x
(
v1
)
− x
(
v2
)
≤ pi
(
v1
) [
t
(
v1
)
− t
(
v2
)]
.
Since
c1/pii
(
v1
)
> c2/pii
(
v2
)
,
the type θ1 innovation requires a longer patent length. If patent lengths
are differentiated in the optimum, then it must be that patent protection is
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longer for the type θ1 innovator (t (v1)−t (v2) > 0). But since pi (v2) > pi (v1)
it is impossible to have
pi
(
v2
) [
t
(
θ1
)
− t
(
θ2
)]
≤ pi
(
v1
) [
t
(
θ1
)
− t
(
θ2
)]
.
Therefore, the social planner should offer a patent of fixed duration at no
charge. The patent length should be fixed at either t = c
2
pi(v2)
and only
the type θ2 innovator will invest or t = c
1
pi(v1)
in which case both types of
innovators would invest. Which of these options is optimal depends on
the benefit that stems from having a shorter patent protection for the type
θ2 versus the cost of not realizing the innovation of type θ1 at all, weighted
by their respective probabilities.
(a) If p (v1)
[
Sp (v1) c
1
pi(v1)
+ S (v1)
(
1
r
− c1
pi(v1)
)]
≥ (1− p (v1)) [S (v2)− Sp (v2)]
[
c1
pi(v1)
− c2
pi(v2)
]
, the social planner
should award a patent of length t = c
1
pi(v1)
to both types of innova-
tors. Both types of innovators will invest. The innovator of type θ1
will be able to just cover her cost, while the innovator of type θ2 will
generate discounted profits strictly above c2, but below
S(v2)
r
.
(b) If p (v1)
[
Sp (v1) c
1
pi(v1)
+ S (v1)
(
1
r
− c1
pi(v1)
)]
< (1− p (v1)) [S (v2)− Sp (v2)]
[
c1
pi(v1)
− c2
pi(v2)
]
, the planner should offer
a patent of length t = c
2
pi(v2)
. Only the innovator of type θ2 will ac-
cept. The innovator of type θ1 will choose not to invest into the idea.
Awarding a patent of length t = c
1
pi(v1)
would be socially wasteful,
since the additional benefit of inducing an innovator of type θ1 would
not outweigh the loss in social surplus due to the extended patent
protection for the type θ2 innovation. The optimal patent length can-
not be longer than t = c
2
pi(v2)
. An innovator of type θ2 would not invest
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into her idea if a patent of length shorter than t = c
2
pi(v2)
is awarded.
Therefore awarding a patent of length t = c
2
pi(v2)
is optimal.
3.4.2 Patents and prizes
Suppose now that prizes are available in addition to patents.
1. Assume that
S(v1)
r
≥ c2. In this case the social planner should award prizes
exclusively in order to maximize social surplus. The prize should be c2 ≤
P (·) ≤ S(v
1)
r
. Since c2 > c1 both types of innovators would invest in their
socially desirable ideas. Since
S(v2)
r
>
S(v1)
r
the upper bound condition
would also hold for the innovator of type θ2. Since prizes are financed
through lump sum taxes, they do not affect social surplus.
2. Assume that
S(v1)
r
< c2. It is optimal for the social planner to randomize
the awarding of a patent or a prize. Let q (v) denote the probability that
the social planner awards a patent and (1− q (v)) denote the probability
that the planner awards a prize. It is possible to induce truth telling by
randomizing over awarding a patent of length t (v1) = c
1
pi(v1)
and t (v2) =
c2
pi(v2)
, respectively, and awarding a prize of P (v1) =
S(v1)
r
and P (v2) =
S(v2)
r
, respectively.
The participation constraints are given by
q
(
v1
)
pi
(
v1
) c1
pi (v1)
− c1 +
(
1− q
(
v1
)) S (v1)
r
≥ 0
q
(
v2
)
pi
(
v2
) c2
pi (v2)
− c2 +
(
1− q
(
v2
)) S (v2)
r
≥ 0.
Notice that the participation constraints will always hold. The incentive
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constraints are given by
q
(
v1
)
pi
(
v1
) c1
pi (v1)
− c1 +
(
1− q
(
v1
)) S (v1)
r
≥ q
(
v2
)
pi
(
v1
) c2
pi (v2)
− c1 +
(
1− q
(
v2
)) S (v2)
r
q
(
v2
)
pi
(
v2
) c2
pi (v2)
− c2 +
(
1− q
(
v2
)) S (v2)
r
≥ q
(
v1
)
pi
(
v2
) c1
pi (v1)
− c2 +
(
1− q
(
v1
)) S (v1)
r
.
Solving for the incentive constraints for q (v2) gives
q
(
v2
)
≥
q (v1)
[
S(v1)
r
− c1
]
+
S(v2)
r
− S(v
1)
r
S(v2)
r
− pi(v1)
pi(v2)
c2
q
(
v2
)
≤
q (v1)
[
S(v1)
r
− pi(v
2)
pi(v1)
c1
]
+
S(v2)
r
− S(v
1)
r
S(v2)
r
− c2 .
The planner can set q (v1) = 0 (that is: award a prize with probability
one to the type θ1). Since pi (v1) < pi (v2),
S(v2)
r
− pi(v
1)
pi(v2)
c2 >
S(v2)
r
− c2
and there exists a q (v2) such that both inequalities hold. Since c
2
pi(v2)
≤ 1
r
and pi (v1) < S (v1), the lower bound will be smaller than 1. In order to
maximize social surplus, the planner should pick the lowest q (v2) feasible
(that is the largest feasible probability of awarding a prize). This is given
by the lower bound, so
q
(
v2
)
=
S(v2)
r
− S(v
1)
r
S(v2)
r
− pi(v1)
pi(v2)
c2
.
3.5 Market information
The cost and value of the idea are not observed by the social planner. How-
ever, an additional firm (also referred to as the competitor) receives information
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s equal to the value of the idea, so s = v. Let pic (v) denote the per-period
change in the competitor’s profit from an innovation of value v while a patent
protecting this innovation is in force. I assume that pic (·) < 0 for all v and
v2 > v1 ⇔ pic (v2) < pic (v1). The competitor (truthfully or untruthfully) reports
the information she received to the social planner. The patent length, the asso-
ciated fee and the prize may all depend on the reported type of the innovator as
well as the reported information of the competitor: t (v, s), x (v, s) and P (v, s),
respectively.
3.5.1 Patents
Suppose that only patents are available as a reward. There are three different
possible relationships between the cost and per-period change in profit associ-
ated with an innovation:
1. If c
1
pi(v1)
= c
2
pi(v2)
, the social planner should award patents of discounted
length t1 = c
1
pi(v1)
= c
2
pi(v2)
= t2 and charge no fees. The information from the
competitor is irrelevant. An innovator of type θ1 (or θ2, respectively) will
not invest in the idea if the patent length is shorter than t1 (or t2, respec-
tively), since she would not be able to cover the cost c1 (or c2, respectively).
Since both types of innovations are assumed to be socially beneficial, a
patent length shorter than t1 (or t2, respectively) cannot be socially opti-
mal. Any patent length longer than t1 (or t2, respectively) would decrease
social surplus. Charging fees would require an increase in patent length
to prevent the innovator from dropping the innovation. The increase in
patent length would decrease social surplus, while the fees would not in-
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crease social surplus. Therefore, the social planner should not charge any
fees. The outcome in terms of social surplus is identical to the full infor-
mation case above.
2. If c
1
pi(v1)
< c
2
pi(v2)
or c
1
pi(v1)
> c
2
pi(v2)
, the social planner should award a patent
of length t (v, s) = c
pi(v)
if the reported type and the reported information
are the same, so t (v1, v1) = c
1
pi(v1)
and t (v2, v2) = c
2
pi(v2)
, and charge no fees,
so x (v1, v1) = 0 and x (v2, v2) = 0. If the reported type and reported in-
formation are different, the social planner awards a patent of maximum
duration to the innovator, so t (v1, v2) = t (v2, v1) = 1
r
, but charges fees of
x (v1, v2) = pi (v2)
[
1
r
− c2
pi(v2)
]
and x (v2, v1) = pi (v1)
[
1
r
− c1
pi(v1)
]
, respectively.
The participation constraints for the innovator are given by
pi
(
v1
)
t
(
v1, v1
)
− c1 − x
(
v1, v1
)
≥ 0
and
pi
(
v2
)
t
(
v2, v2
)
− c2 − x
(
v2, v2
)
≥ 0.
Given the proposed patent lengths and fees above, the participation con-
straints become
pi
(
v1
) c1
pi (v1)
− c1 ≥ 0
and
pi
(
v2
) c2
pi (v2)
− c2 ≥ 0.
The incentive constraints are given by
pi
(
v1
)
t
(
v1, v1
)
− c1 − x
(
v1, v1
)
≥ pi
(
v1
)
t
(
v2, v1
)
− c1 − x
(
v2, v1
)
and
pi
(
v2
)
t
(
v2, v2
)
− c2 − x
(
v2, v2
)
≥ pi
(
v2
)
t
(
v1, v2
)
− c2 − x
(
v1, v2
)
.
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Given the proposed patent lengths and fees above, the incentive con-
straints become
pi
(
v1
) c1
pi (v1)
− c1 ≥ pi
(
v1
) 1
r
− c1 − pi
(
v1
) [1
r
− c
1
pi (v1)
]
and
pi
(
v2
) c2
pi (v2)
− c2 ≥ pi
(
v2
) 1
r
− c2 − pi
(
v2
) [1
r
− c
2
pi (v2)
]
.
The social planner can induce the competitor to participate in the mecha-
nism by awarding a patent of maximum length in the case that the com-
petitor does not report to the social planner. The participation constraints
for the competitor are given by
pic
(
v1
)
t
(
v1, v1
)
≥ pic
(
v1
) 1
r
and
pic
(
v2
)
t
(
v2, v2
)
≥ pic
(
v2
) 1
r
.
Any patent length shorter than the maximum patent length is preferred
by the competitor, so the participation constraints will always hold. The
incentive constraints are given by
pic
(
v1
)
t
(
v1, v1
)
≥ pic
(
v1
)
t
(
v1, v2
)
and
pic
(
v2
)
t
(
v2, v2
)
≥ pic
(
v2
)
t
(
v2, v1
)
.
Given the proposed patent lengths above, the incentive constraints be-
come
pic
(
v1
) c1
pi (v1)
≥ pic
(
v1
) 1
r
and
pic
(
v2
) c2
pi (v2)
≥ pic
(
v2
) 1
r
.
The outcome in terms of social surplus is identical to the full information
case above.
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3.5.2 Patents and prizes
Suppose now that prizes are available in addition to patents. The social planner
should award prizes of c1 ≤ P (v1) ≤ S(v
1)
r
and c2 ≤ P (v2) ≤ S(v
2)
r
, respectively,
based on the report from the competitor. Since the competitor is not affected by
the size of the transfer to the innovator, she can report truthfully. Since Sp (v) <
S (v), any positive patent length would decrease social surplus. The outcome in
terms of social surplus is identical to the full information case above.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I derived optimal mechanisms of awarding patents and prizes
under three different information environments. Using the full information en-
vironment as the benchmark, I analyzed the case in which information about
the value of an innovation is either only observed by the innovating firm or
by the innovating firm and another firm in the same industry. In general, the
social planner awards prizes whenever these are available as a policy instru-
ment. While there exist mechanisms to reveal the social value of an innovation
under the private information environment, truth telling can only be achieved
by providing some patent protection in most of the considered cases. The so-
cial surplus is then lower than the full information benchmark. When market
information about the social value of an innovation is available from a competi-
tor, the social planner can achieve the same level of social surplus as in the full
information benchmark.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
Table A.1: Granted Patents and Patent Applications by Technology Field:
SEC Sample
Notes: Granted patents and patent applications as of date of trade. Technology field definitions based on ?.
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Table A.2: Granted Patents and Patent Applications by Technology Field:
Random Sample
Notes: Granted patents and patent applications as of date of trade. Technology field definitions based on ?.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
Figure B.1: Market Share in the Corn Seed Industry
Notes: Data for the time period 1988 to 1998 from USDA Agriculture Information Bulletin #786. Data for 2009 are
estimates from Deutsche Bank Research (as quoted in the Des Moines Register October 5, 2009). The 1998 data point
for Monsanto is the combined market share of Dekalb and Asgrow. Dekalb was purchased by the Monsanto in 1998.
Monsanto completed the acquisition of Asgrow in 1998.
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Figure B.2: Comparison of absolute Yields reported in the Patents with ab-
solute Yields from independent Field Trials
Notes: Each of the 12 data points represents a new hybrid for which we observe the absolute yield level in the patent
document as well as in the Kentucky Performance Test reports. Since yield for the same hybrid vary from year
to year, all absolute yield levels were normalized to 1998 yields level using data on the average yield in the U.S.
Since we do not observe the information on the year in which the field trials were conducted for the data in the
patent document, we use the year prior the year of application as the estimate. Data on yields were collected by
a manual search of the full text of patent documents. Independent test station data from the University of Kentucky
(http://www.uky.edu/Ag/GrainCrops/varietytesting.htm). Data on U.S. averages from the United States Department
of Agriculture (www.nass.usda.gov).
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Figure B.3: Increase in Yield - Comparison of Breeder’s reported Field Trial
Data with independent Field Trial Data from the Kentucky Test
Stations
Notes: Each of the 17 data points represents a new hybrid for which we observe a direct comparison with an existing
plant in the patent document as well as in the Kentucky Performance Test reports. Data on yields were collected by
a manual search of the full text of patent documents. Independent test station data from the University of Kentucky
(http://www.uky.edu/Ag/GrainCrops/varietytesting.htm).
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Figure B.4: Increase in Income - Comparison of Breeder’s reported Field
Trial Data with independent Field Trial Data from the Ken-
tucky Test Stations
Notes: Each of the 17 data points represents a new hybrid for which we observe a direct comparison with
an existing plant in the patent document as well as in the Kentucky Performance Test reports. Data on in-
come per acre were collected by a manual search of the full text of patent documents. Increases in in-
come per acre are also calculated based on independent test station data from the University of Kentucky
(http://www.uky.edu/Ag/GrainCrops/varietytesting.htm).
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